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1.  Introduction 
 The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) was established out of concern over 
the lack of uniformity in interstate taxation and the fear that in the absence of 
voluntary uniformity the federal government would dictate the nature of uniformity.  
This paper first considers why the MTC was formed and what it is and does.  In the 
remainder of the paper we focus on the issue of tax uniformity.  We consider what the 
MTC has accomplished and compare that to what might be expected of a voluntary 
compact.  Finally, we consider alternative ways of achieving uniformity.  In the 
discussion of uniformity we focus on the state corporate income tax since state sales 
and use taxes are the subject of the paper by Swain and Hellerstein (2005).  We want 
to make it clear that this paper is not an expose or an evaluation of the MTC.  Rather, 
it is a discussion of the MTC and its role in achieving interstate tax uniformity of 
state corporate income tax systems. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next two sections we discuss 
the MTC, how it came to be and what it does.  We also present a brief history of 
efforts to achieve uniformity of state corporate income taxes.  In section 4 we discuss 
the case for interstate uniformity.  We then turn to a discussion of what might be 
expected of an interstate compact, focusing on both “theory” and evidence from other 
compacts.  In section 7 we present information about the degree of uniformity of state 
corporate income taxes that has been achieved since the formation of the MTC.  In 
section 8, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative approaches to 
achieving uniformity, namely voluntary compacts versus federal mandates.  Section 9 
contains some concluding remarks. 
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2.  Precursors and Pressures 
The roots of MTC formation lay in the lack of uniformity of state tax systems.  
We begin our inquiry near the close of the 19th century.  Tax nonconformity 
motivated seven states to send representatives to a conference in 1892 that culminated 
with the formation of the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL).  By 1912, all of the states had appointed commissioners to 
NCCUSL.  Tax policy analysts are most familiar with the Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) which was promulgated by NCCUSL in the 
late 1950s.  In practice the uniformity focus of NCCUSL has long encompassed more 
than just tax policy.1 But the organization has had an undeniable impact on the tax 
policies of the states. 
 
The Introduction of State Income Taxes 
 Nonconformity of state tax systems became a major issue following the 
widespread adoption of personal and corporate income taxes in the early 20th 
century,2 a period that coincided with an expanding multistate presence on the part of 
corporate taxpayers.  Wisconsin implemented its income tax in 1911, two years prior 
to the ratification of the 16th Amendment, which enabled the federal income tax.  
Corporate income was initially apportioned in Wisconsin on the basis of “business 
transactions” and property (Hellerstein and Hellerstein, 1988).  Sixteen states had 
adopted a corporate income tax by 1930 (Pomp and Oldman, 2001).   
Early commentators bemoaned this evolving structure of corporate taxation.  
Mudge notes in 1934 that “...the tax methods are almost as numerous as the taxing 
jurisdictions” (p.532). Hunter and Allen similarly note in 1940 “There is lack of 
                                                          
1See: www.nccusl.org.   
2Concerns were also voiced regarding nonconformity of inheritance and estate taxes and the 
subsequent threat of multiple taxation.  By 1929, 45 states had some form of inheritance/estate tax.  
Seligman (1925) among others criticizes these systems and discusses possible remedies, including 
federal intervention and federal assumption of inheritance/estate taxes.  Cooperative interstate 
agreements are dismissed by Seligman because of the different interests of the states. 
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uniformity not only in the method by which corporations in general are taxed, but 
also in the taxation of specific types of corporations” (p.358).3 
 State practice certainly showed wide variation in this early era of corporate 
income taxation.  While some states used the familiar three-factor formula4 for the 
apportionment of corporate income, others used single- or two-factor formulas, 
including sales-only factors and property-only factors.  There were also disparities in 
the way in which sales (i.e. receipts), property and payroll were measured and 
implemented in the various apportionment formulas.  For example, there was 
differential treatment of receipts from the sale of tangible goods, intangibles (like 
securities) and services, and similar incongruities in the treatment of real, personal 
and intangible property.  The three-factor formula was challenged in Pennsylvania in 
1936 on the basis that different factors meant different tax burdens for firms with 
similar income in a given state (Hellerstein and Hellerstein, 1988).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court not only upheld the three-factor formula but also ruled that uniformity 
does not preclude classification systems that allow different apportionment systems 
for different industries.5 
 The National Tax Association (NTA) weighed in early on the issue of state 
taxation of multistate entities to address “…the conflicting claims of independent 
taxing authorities” (Hunter and Allen, 1940, pp. 599).  In the early 20th Century 
working committees of the NTA were focused on the lack of tax policy uniformity 
across the states but they could not reach agreement on possible remedies.  
Agreement was reached by the time the 26th annual conference was held in Phoenix 
in  1933.   A  model  tax  system  was  proposed  by  the  NTA  that  included a single  
                                                          
3Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1988) comment on the disarray of business taxes that prevailed 
across the states in the pre-income tax era.  
4A multistate corporation’s tax base is apportioned based on that portion of net income attributable 
to a particular state using a formula.  The use of the three-factor formula requires multiplication of 
net multistate income by a fraction representing the arithmetic average of the ratios of property, 
sales and payroll factors – with each of the three factor expressed as a fraction with the numerator 
representing the dollar value within the state and the denominator representing the dollar value 
elsewhere.   
5Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox (1936). 
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business tax on corporate income and the use of the three-factor formula to apportion 
income.  At the time, 4 states were in fact utilizing the three-factor formula.  But the 
NTA recognized that agreement and cooperation between the states would be 
difficult if not impossible to realize in practice (Hunter and Allen, 1940). 
 
The States Push the Envelope 
 Through the 1950s the states pushed the limits of apportionment, including 
more and more income that had previously been subject to allocation.6  This meant 
shifting tax burdens for firms and shifting corporate revenue streams for the states.  
Uncertainties arose regarding state nexus standards and the right to tax corporate 
income, as well as what income would be apportioned and allocated, and to where 
this income would be distributed.  UDITPA was adopted by NCCUSL in 1957 in an 
effort to encourage greater uniformity in taxation across the states.  While UDITPA 
offered a common basis for the interstate distribution of corporate income, it did not 
address other quarrelsome issues like nexus.7 
 The nexus issue reared its ugly head in 1959 with the decision rendered by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Northwestern Portland Cement v. Minnesota.8  The Court 
ruled that the solicitation of sales was a sufficient basis to enable the state’s right to 
tax corporate income.  The business community was outraged and thus engaged 
Congress, which ultimately passed Public Law 86-272.  This law was seen as a 
temporary measure and offered nexus protection to corporations for which the sole 
activity in a state was the solicitation of sales of tangible goods.9  PL 86-272 was 
“temporary” in the sense that it was accompanied by a mandate for Congress to study 
                                                          
6Following UDITPA, apportionable income is that which is derived from the regular course of 
business and trade, while allocable income is all other income.  Allocable income typically 
includes income from intangibles and is generally assigned for tax purposes on a residency basis 
to the state of corporate domicile.   
7The corporate income tax was not the only point of contention between businesses and the states.  
There were also concerns regarding the sales tax, including the failure of some states to grant 
credits under the use tax for sales tax paid in other states and uncertainty regarding state nexus 
standards (Kinnear, 1971). 
8See Peters (1997) and Pomp and Oldman (2001) for a broader discussion of this case. 
9There remains some question today regarding the applicability of 86-272 to firms selling 
intangible services.  The MTC deems certain repair services as exceeding the solicitation of orders 
standard established by 86-272 (Hellerstein and Hellerstein, 1988). 
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the state taxation of business and make recommendations to promote uniformity.  The 
Willis Commission was established to study the issue and its report was released in 
1965.  Pressures mounted for a state response. 
 Congress reacted to the Willis Commission Report (1965) by proposing a 
legislated remedy in the form of H.R. 11798.10  The bill included a physical nexus 
standard, a two-factor property/payroll apportionment formula, full apportionment of 
all corporate income and federal oversight of state corporate income taxation through 
the Secretary of the Treasury.  The states felt threatened by the proposed 
Congressional action, generally fearing the loss of sovereignty to the federal 
government.  Market states were disappointed that there was no sales factor in the 
apportionment formula.  Through full apportionment some states would have lost 
revenue previously derived from allocable income, in particular dividend income.  
And the states wanted the flexibility to pursue their own policy objectives, especially 
the promotion of economic development through the corporate income tax.  
Uniformity, particularly uniformity of the federal variety, was not what the states 
wanted.  Some members of the business community objected as well to the proposed 
federal legislation.  One specific concern was the potential apportionment of foreign-
source income and dividends. 
 
The MTC is Established 
As these events transpired the challenge became one of balance.  The 
horizontal sovereignty of the states in a federalist system had to be weighed against 
the vertical constraints of the Constitution and the preferences of a Congress that was 
heavily lobbied by the business community.  The states reacted quickly.  In 1966, at 
the impetus of the Council of State Governments and with the participation of the 
National Association of Tax Administrators, the concept of a Multistate Tax Compact 
was hatched.  The Compact would come into play when 7 states adopted its 
provisions; the Compact included UDITPA as the basis for distributing corporate 
income.  On August 4, 1967 the Compact and its executive body, the MTC was 
                                                          
10The following discussion draws heavily from Peters (1997) and Sharpe (1975), as well as 
Brunori’s (1999) interview with Eugene Corrigan, the first Executive Director of MTC. 
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enabled.11  The Compact was not Congressionally-sanctioned as a formal compact 
with binding regulatory authority.  In fact, the states objected to S. 3333 which would 
have granted such expansive regulatory authority.12  The states clearly wanted the 
freedom to pursue their own policy agendas. 
 In the early days of the MTC there were some cooperative efforts with the 
business community.13  But disputes over the treatment of dividends and foreign-
source income could not be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.  Friction soon 
arose in response to MTC’s interstate (joint) audit practices which relied on world-
wide combined reporting methods and a broad approach to income apportionment 
(see below).  World-wide reporting was not consistent either with reporting under the 
federal corporate income tax nor with the practice in the international community. 
 The business community stiffened its back and sought remedy through 
Congressional action, state action, and litigation.  The Committee on State Taxation, 
originally linked to the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, was formed to 
represent and lobby on behalf of large multistate taxpayers.  None of the bills 
submitted to Congress passed as they all included elements opposed by the respective 
parties.14  Pressure from the business community was effective in causing Florida, 
Illinois and Indiana to withdraw from the Compact.   
 Litigation culminated with United States Steel Corp et al. v. Multistate Tax 
Commission,  a  class-action  law suit started in 1972 ultimately representing 16 large  
                                                          
11Johnson (2001) provides a history of the MTC. 
12S. 3333 was an ad hoc bill introduced in 1972, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session.  Kinnear (1971) notes 
the absence of MTC support for the bill.  The 1971/72 MTC Annual Report states that some state 
tax administrators thought the bill would exempt too much corporate income from tax. 
13Bucks (2000) provides a list of more recent cooperative efforts between the MTC and the 
business community. 
14Cahoon and Brown (1973) call for “uniform federal rules” and discuss the Ribicoff-Mathias Bill, 
S. 1245, which was introduced in Congress in 1973.  For the state corporate income tax the bill 
would have required a physical presence rule for nexus, allowed for variations in the nature of 
formulary apportionment, precluded apportionment and allocation of foreign-source income and 
required allocation of dividend income.  Sales would have been assigned on destination basis and 
throwback rules would not have been allowed.  A federal court of claims would have been used to 
settle disputes. 
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corporations, with funding support provided by COST (Oveson, 2002).  The plaintiffs 
had several concerns, including the constitutionality of the Compact and the 
legitimacy of multijurisdictional audits.  In focusing on the Compact Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, the Court examined whether the Compact increased the political 
power of the states vis-a-vis the federal government.  The Court ruled against the 
plaintiffs in 1978 and sustained the Multistate Tax Compact.15  
Also sustained was the conflict between the MTC and the business 
community.  Joint audits have remained a contentious issue, as discussed below.  
And, a storm of controversy was created by the issuance of Nexus Program Bulletin 
95-1 in 1995, which in the eyes of the MTC was intended to clarify nexus standards 
for the computer industry.  In response, California almost withdrew from the 
Compact.  Efforts to promote uniformity have encountered staunch opposition from 
businesses and COST, which is no longer affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.  (As Peters [1997] notes, not even COST can agree on uniformity 
measures because of the different interests of different members of the business 
community.)  Incentives like sales-weighted apportionment, which deviate from 
UDITPA, are illustrative of the pressures created by the self interest of the states and 
corporations. 
                                                          
15See section 6 for a discussion of this case. 
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3.  Multistate Tax Compact and Commission 
 The Multistate Tax Compact is a model tax law that may be adopted by the 
states through discretionary legislative action.  The Multistate Tax Commission was 
enabled and its broad parameters for operation defined through creation of the 
Compact.  The intent of the Compact is to:  
• ensure the “equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement of 
apportionment disputes,”  
• “promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax 
systems,” 
•  support “taxpayer convenience and compliance” and  
• “avoid duplicative taxation” (mtc.gov/compact/html).   
The preservation of state sovereignty is not mentioned explicitly in the Compact 
itself.  However, this goal does appear in statements made by Commission members 
and in Commission publications (e.g. Multistate Tax Commission Review, September 
2001).   
The most salient features of the Compact include Articles IV (UDITPA), VII 
(uniform regulations and forms), VIII (interstate audits) and IX (arbitration for 
dispute resolution).  The Compact also details the general powers and the committee 
structure of the Commission, as well as the required financial contributions of 
member states.  The Commission is charged with developing bylaws to govern its 
operations.  There is no explicit mechanism in the Compact or in the Commission 
bylaws to change the language of the Compact.  The bylaws may be changed through 
Commission action. 
 Neither the Compact nor the positions taken by the Commission are binding 
on member states.  While full members (see below) are required to adopt the 
Compact, including UDITPA, they are not bound to any uniformity provisions or 
policies, and have no legal responsibility other than payment of dues.  In practice 
member states have deviated from UDITPA, a good example being the adoption of 
sales-weighted corporate income apportionment formulas rather than UDITPA’s 
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recommended three-factor formula.16  States may formally withdraw from 
membership by repealing the Compact, inclusive of UDITPA.  The voluntary nature 
of Compact and Commission policy adoption on the part of the states reflects the 
desire to preserve state sovereignty over tax policy and tax administration.  An 
important practical consequence, however, is the inability to achieve one of the core 
objectives of the Compact, the uniformity of state tax systems.  The MTC itself notes 
in a discussion of uniformity that “…it would be inappropriate to suggest any or all 
variations in individual state laws should or could be eliminated” (MTC Annual 
Report, 1971/72, p. 2). 
Interestingly, in the process to create another interstate compact--the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement--the ‘flaws’ of the MTC related to the 
pursuit of uniformity are highlighted:  
A caution: Although a Governing Board is provided for, the 
[Streamlined Sales and Use Tax] Agreement does not arm it with 
disciplinary powers. If member states want to bend or break a rule or 
two, there appears to be no formal mechanism for forcing compliance 
with the Agreement once a state is accepted as a member. [State of 
Washington adopted a version of the Agreement that does not accept 
the Agreement’s transaction sourcing rules.] This is the same flaw 
present in the Multistate Tax Compact (governing the allocation and 
apportionment  of income among states). Almost every member of the  
                                                          
16From a review of MTC annual reports, it appears that Minnesota was the first full-member state 
to deviate from UDITPA’s uniform three-factor formula for income apportionment as it adopted a 
70 percent sales factor in 1987.  Florida was a compact member in 1971 when it implemented its 
corporate income tax, but it deleted UDITPA (1971/72 MTC Annual Report) and later withdrew 
from the Compact.  There is no bright-line test on how far a state can stray from the Compact and 
no mechanism to sanction a member state for any deviations from UDITPA.  In the context of 
UDITPA, Pomp and Oldman (2001, pp. 10-12) note that “Nonsubstantial deviations are 
permitted.”  Nonmember states that have adopted UDITPA don’t necessarily adopt all of its 
provisions.  For example, West Virginia adopted UDITPA but used a sales-only factor in 1971 
(MTC Annual Report, 1971/72).  MTC notes that the “optional feature” of UDITPA adoption in 
the context of multistate taxpayers who may benefit from deviations from the three-factor formula.  
States can choose to offer unique formulas, but they can also make “…uniformity available to 
taxpayers where and when desired” (MTC Annual Report, 1969/70, p. 3). 
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Multistate Tax Compact (including New Mexico) violates the 
Compact’s requirement that income be apportioned based on equally-
weighted property, payroll and sales factors. Other than wringing its 
collective hands, the Compact’s board has done nothing to stop 
members from adopting numerous variations.17 
 
 The current Commission bylaws (not the Compact) provide for four different 
membership categories, which reflect a differential scope of participation in the 
organization.  The presumed intent is to engage a broader set of states in a dialogue 
with the Commission.  There are currently 21 full Compact members, the same 
number of full members as in 1971, although the mix of states has changed.  Compact 
members are afforded complete voting and committee participation rights within the 
MTC.  Sovereignty members, of which there are 5, pay the same dues as Compact 
members and are entitled to participate in meetings and serve on committees other 
than the Executive Committee; Sovereignty members do not hold voting rights.  
Associate and Project members pay on a fee-for-service basis for programs and 
activities and may be charged rates higher than those imposed on Compact and 
Sovereignty members; Associate members may serve on committees but they do not 
hold voting rights.  States holding these other membership positions need not adopt 
UDITPA.  Only four states have chosen to have no membership linkage with the 
MTC.  Member-state representatives are required to be those who serve as heads of 
state revenue agencies that oversee the taxes that fall under the scope of the MTC.18  
They are appointed by state governors and must be approved by the state senate.   
 Table 1 shows membership status by fiscal year, drawn from available MTC 
Annual Reports.  In the initial years of the MTC the bylaws only enabled Compact 
members  and  Associate  members.  In 1967/68 there were 13 Compact members and 
                                                          
17O’Neill (undated, p.3). 
18See Article VI.  The Compact additionally states that “Each party state shall provide by law for 
the selection of representatives from its subdivisions affected by this compact to consult with the 
Commission member from that State.”  Multistate Tax Compact, Article 6 (b).  This provision 
provides some assurance the substate jurisdictions at least have an indirect voice at the table. 
67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89-92/93 93/94 94/95-96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01-03/04 04/05
AL A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A M M M M M
AK A A N M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
AZ A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
AR M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
CA A A A A A A A M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
CO N M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
CT N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A A A
DE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
DC N N N N N N N N N N N N N M M M M M M M M M M M M M
FL M M M M M M M M N N N N N N N N N N N N N P S S S S
GA N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
HI M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
ID M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
IL M M M M M M M N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A A
IN A A A N M M M M M N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
IA N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P
KS M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
KY N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P A A A S
LA N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A S
ME N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A M M M M
MD N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
MA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
MI A N N M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
MN N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A M M M M M M M M M M M
MS N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A
MO M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
MT A N M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
NE M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M N N N N P P P P P
NV M M M M M M M M M M M M M N N N N N N N N N N N N N
NH N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A A A
NJ N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A S
NM M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
NY N A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A
NC N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A N A
ND A N M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
OH N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
OK N N N N N N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A A
OR M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
PA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
RI N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P
SC N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P A A A
SD N A A A A A A A M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
TN N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
TX M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
UT A M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
VT N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A
VA N A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
WA M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M
WV A A A A A A A A A A A A A M M N M N N N N A A A A A
WI N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A A A A A
WY N M M M M M M M M N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N S
NOTE:  M=Compact Members; S=Sovereignty Members; A=Associate Members; P=Project Members; N=Non-Members
Fiscal Year
Table 1:  MTC Membership Trends
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12 Associate members.19  By 1993/94 Project member status had been adopted and 
by 1997/98 Sovereignty members had been enabled by the MTC.  Many states have 
chosen to jump directly to full Compact membership status, others have moved 
through the ranks of membership status and some have been stable members of some 
form.  There are numerous instances of members withdrawing from the MTC, 
including Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.20  In some cases states have subsequently re-
joined the MTC.  The broadened scope of membership categories seems to have been 
quite effective in drawing a larger number of states into the MTC. 
Both the Commission bylaws and the Compact speak to voting procedures.  A 
quorum is represented by a majority of Commission members.  The Compact (Article 
6, paragraph (c)) notes that “...no action shall be binding unless approved by a 
majority of the total number of members.”21  The bylaws go one step further by 
requiring not only a majority of states, but also a majority of the population of the 
member states.   
 As the only committee entity created by the Compact, the Executive 
Committee has seven members, including a chair, vice chair, treasurer and four other 
members elected by the Commission at large.  The Executive Committee is governed 
by the bylaws of the MTC.  The bylaws state that members serve single year terms; a 
quorum is represented by four or more members.  An Executive Director position 
was also established by the bylaws to oversee the administrative affairs of the 
Commission.  The formation of other committees is also enabled by the bylaws.   
 The Compact delineates the budgeting process and financial structure of the 
Commission.  The Commission develops a budget for its activities which is then 
submitted to the member states for approval.  Membership dues in support of the 
general activities of the Commission are set by formula, with 10 percent split equally 
                                                          
19To the extent possible the data in Table 1 are based on membership during the relevant fiscal 
year.  In some instances this has not proven possible.  For example, in 1967/68 the Annual Report 
show full membership status by date, while there is only a listing of associate members with no 
indication of when the states joined MTC. 
20Maine recently voted to drop its membership. 
21Emphasis added.  It is interesting that the word binding is used when states cannot in fact be 
bound by the policies of the Compact and the Commission. 
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across member states and 90 percent based on each member’s share of state and local 
revenue derived from income, capital stock, gross receipts and sales/use taxes.  
Therefore, the MTC budget does not increase with larger state and local tax 
collections in a particular state; only its share of the MTC formula is subject to 
change.  Some specific activities, notably interstate audits (discussed below), are 
provided by the MTC on a fee-for-service basis. 
As reported in its first Annual Report (1967/68), revenues totaled $197,000.  
Revenue and expenditure data for the period 1985/86 through 2003/04 are shown in 
Figure 1.  These data include total revenues and spending for unappropriated, 
appropriated and restricted funds.  Together the data reflect all activities of the MTC, 
including the interstate audit program and the NEXUS program.  Revenues totaled 
nearly $1.9 million in 1985/86 and rose to $5.2 million in 2003/04, reflecting a 
compound annual growth rate of 5.7 percent. 
 
FIGURE 1.  REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE MTC, 1986-2004 
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
D
ol
la
rs
Expenditures Revenues
Note: Includes revenues and expenditures from unappropriated funds, appropriated funds and restricted funds.
 
Source:  MTC, direct correspondence. 
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Commission Activities 
 Commission powers are specified in the Compact and include studying state 
and local tax systems and taxes, developing uniformity or compatibility proposals 
and providing information to facilitate compliance with state and local tax laws.  The 
Compact specifically spells out the general parameters for development of uniformity 
provisions, the conduct of interstate audits, and dispute resolution through arbitration.  
In practice the range of Commission activities is rather extensive and goes well 
beyond the parameters of the Compact.  It has been engaged in visible multistate 
activities like the Streamlined Sales Tax Program (SSTP), written amicus curiae 
briefs on behalf of both states and taxpayers,22 offered training programs and 
seminars, issued studies and reports,23 implemented initiatives like the national nexus 
program,24 and passed policy resolutions.25  The Commission is also actively 
engaged in communication with other interstate bodies both formally and informally.  
TaxExchange, for example, is an electronic-based system for dialogue between the 
MTC and the Federation of Tax Administrators.  Finally, in a cooperative effort with 
COST the MTC developed an Alternative Dispute Resolution Program (ADR) that 
was adopted by the Commission in 1995.  A primary purpose of the ADR was to use 
discussion and dialogue to cooperatively resolve disputes between multistate 
taxpayers and the states and avoid costly and uncertain litigation. 
 
                                                          
22In 2004 the MTC and COST each filed an amicus brief in support of a taxpayer (AT&T), the 
first time they have done so.   The annual reports of MTC devote considerable space to the 
discussion of litigation activities. http://www.statetax.org/Template.cfm? Section=Briefs_ 
Filed&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=5085.  For recently filed 
briefs see http://www.mtc.gov/amicus%20briefs.htm.   
23A good example is Federalism at Risk, published in 2003.  The Commission also publishes the 
Multistate Tax Commission Review on an irregular basis.  The Review offers information on 
Commission activities and special reports on timely policy issues. 
24This is a voluntary multistate disclosure program that allows firms to resolve sales, income and 
franchise tax liability uncertainties with states that have chosen to participate in the nexus 
program.  The service is provided at no cost to taxpayers. 
25The policy resolutions include both honorary/congratulatory and substantive positions 
(commonly on uniformity) taken by the Commission.  See http://www.mtc.gov/POLICY/ 
2004res.htm.  Some resolutions percolate up through the MTC committee structure while others 
are initiated at the Commission level. 
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Joint Audit Program 
 The Joint Audit Program began in 1969 with the completion of three pilot 
audits, two covering the corporate income tax and one covering the sales tax.  With 
the hiring of an audit coordinator in 1969, MTC notes that “There is the real 
possibility that constructive results of [audit] activities may soon overshadow all 
other Commission activities in furthering the causes of equity, uniformity and tax 
administration efficiency among the states” (MTC Annual Report, 1969/70, p. 11).  
By 1971, field offices for corporate income tax auditing had been established in New 
York and Chicago, with 3 auditors in each office.  The Audit Program was described 
as MTC’s most prominent activity in its 1977/78 MTC Annual Report. 
The Audit Program turned out to be a contentious issue with taxpayers in the 
early years of the Commission.  Some firms balked at requests for information and 
data that were to support the audit.  Subpoenas ultimately were issued by the states to 
secure information from taxpayers who resisted MTC’s actions.  There was a 
backlash in 1972 when legal action was taken by U.S. Steel in response to an MTC 
audit.  U.S. Steel took the position that MTC was an unconstitutional construct (see 
Krol, 1975).  Other taxpayers, as well as COST, soon joined the case on behalf of 
U.S. Steel.  This case preoccupied MTC until February of 1978 when the Supreme 
Court ruled 7 to 2 against the plaintiffs.  In the intervening years MTC had won a 
series of favorable lawsuits regarding the viability of its audit program in state courts, 
as discussed in their Annual Reports. 
The business community’s more specific objections to the audit program 
were numerous (Krol, 1975).  Perhaps most prominent was the concern over the use 
of the combined reporting system as the basis for information gathering to support the 
MTC audits.  MTC auditors used combined reporting over the unitary business entity 
at the request of the states, not at its own initiative.  In practice this meant collection 
of information from “…all affiliates wherein more than 50 percent common 
ownership is involved” (Cappetta, 1974, p. 55). 
 The Audit Program had many stated objectives, including enhanced 
efficiency for both states and taxpayers who could avoid multiplicative audits.  MTC 
also notes that it may spare corporate taxpayers from multiple taxation and reveal to 
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the states some of the consequences of nonuniformity in tax structure.  According to 
the first executive director: 
These audits help provide uniform interpretations through the 
decisions of a single auditor acting on behalf of many states with 
respect to the same taxpayer.  The auditor can demonstrate to the 
states the effects of varying interpretations.  Because variations by the 
states often are inadvertent, the auditor’s mere exposure of variations 
often will result in a return to the norm by the states. (Corrigan, 1976, 
p. 437) 
 
 The audit selection process begins when a state recommends to MTC’s Audit 
Committee that a firm be selected for examination.  The Audit Committee then 
contacts other states to determine their interest in pursuing the case.  Based upon the 
response from the states a recommendation is made on whether the examination 
should go forward.  Taxpayers may also request that an MTC audit be undertaken.  
MTC staff auditors conduct the examination and make recommendations to the 
individual states regarding refunds or assessments; states are not bound by the 
outcome of the audit.  Individual states pay for the audits on a fee-for-service basis.  
In fiscal year 1993/94 MTC completed 13 sales tax audits and 9 income tax audits 
entailing 229 contacts with the states; total audit fees were nearly $1.7 million, or 
$77,193 per audit. 
 The number of audits conducted in any given year has never been particularly 
large.  Through the decade of the 1990s a peak of 12 completed income tax audits 
took place in 1993 and encompassed 132 state contracts.  Between 1983/84 and 
1993/94 assessments plus collections for the income and sales taxes totaled $290 
million, benefiting 24 states.  Audit productivity has shown considerable variation.  
In 1984/85 there was $29 in assessments for every dollar spent on auditing; a low of 
7:1 was recorded in 1973/74.   
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Uniformity 
 MTC has a formal system in place for the development of uniformity 
recommendations.26  Generally the recommendations work their way up through the 
Uniformity and Executive Committees.  The Uniformity Committee is comprised of 
revenue agency personnel who have been appointed by their respective Commission 
member.  Upon request the Uniformity Committee drafts a study for internal review.  
If the proposal receives Committee approval, public input is sought through public 
participation working groups, which include as members various affected parties, 
notably the states and representatives of the business community.  The working group 
drafts its version of the proposal for consideration by the Uniformity and Executive 
Committees.  The Executive Committee then takes action, including tabling the 
initiative or moving it forward for public hearing.  Based on input from the public 
hearing, member states are polled to see whether a majority would adopt the proposal 
as a Commission policy; they need not agree to adopt the proposal as part of their 
own tax system.  If a majority is in favor of the initiative (both a majority of states 
and a majority of state population represented by MTC members) a formal vote is 
held.  Upon passage the states are informed of the recommended policy. 
 
                                                          
26See: http://www.mtc.gov/UNIFORM/9STEPS.HTM. 
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4. Is There a Need For State Corporate Income Tax  
Coordination? 
 
 As noted above, the MTC performs many functions.  But in the remainder of 
this paper we focus on tax uniformity, in part because that was the principal purpose 
for establishing the MTC.  Because Swain and Hellerstein (2005) focus on the sales 
tax, we limit our discussion to state corporate income tax.  As noted above and 
discussed in section 7, it is the case that there is a lack of interstate uniformity in state 
corporate income taxes.   
Concern over the lack of uniformity has a long history.  As far back as 1916, 
the National Tax Association focused on the lack of uniformity in the distribution of 
income to the various states, and for many years had a standing committee that 
considered the issue of state corporate income tax uniformity.27  But the Willis 
Commission conducted perhaps the most extensive study of interstate taxation.  The 
Willis Commission concluded: 
It has been found that the present system of State taxation as it affects 
interstate commerce works badly for both business and the States.  It 
has also been found that the major problems encountered are not 
those of any one of the taxes studied but rather are common to all of 
them. This is not surprising in that all of these problems reflect the 
pervasive conflict between the approach of the taxation of interstate 
companies as it appears in State and local law, and the practical 
difficulties of realistic compliance expectations and effective 
enforcement.  Increasingly the States, reinforced by judicial sanction, 
have broadened the spread of tax obligations of multistate sellers.  As 
the principle of taxation by the State of the market has been accepted, 
the law has prescribed substantially nationwide responsibility for 
more and more companies.  The expanding spread of tax obligations 
has not, however, been accompanied by the development of an 
approach by the States which would allow these companies to take a 
                                                          
27For a history of the NTA’s involvement see the Willis Commission Report, pp. 128-133. 
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national view of their tax obligations.  The result is a pattern of State 
and local taxation which cannot be made to operate efficiently and 
equitable when applied to those companies who activities bring them 
into contact with many States. 
 
First, it was found that the system is characterized by widespread 
noncompliance. … 
 
A second defect of the current system is its tendency to give rise 
to overtaxation and undertaxation. … 
 
A third defect of the present system is the existence of provisions 
which are advantageous to locally based companies relative to 
competitors based elsewhere. 
… 
A fourth defect of the present system is the attitude which it has 
generated among taxpayers, especially small and moderate-sized 
companies.  The diversities and complexities in legal rules, the 
prevalence of returns in which the cost of compliance exceed the tax, 
… and other aspects of the present system have produced widespread 
resistance to the assumption of taxpayer responsibility. …  
 
The problems found in this system as it operates today are 
sufficiently troublesome to require that something must be done.  
Even more disquieting, however, are the prospects for the future.  … 
 
A prescribed system as widely disregarded as the present one 
cannot be said to be one which the interests of the States demand be 
preserved intact at all costs.  At the same time the interests of the 
nation in a free flow of commerce, unhampered by needless 
interference, clearly call for a change.  The recommendations which 
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follow present a program designed to establish a system that will 
work better for both business and the States (pp.1127-1128). 
 
Many students of tax uniformity have noted, sometimes in rather strong 
terms, the condition of state corporate income tax uniformity.  In 1981, McLure 
wrote, “Though substantial progress has been made toward uniformity since the 
landmark Northwestern Portland Cement v Minnesota case was decided in 1959, 
states taxation of the income of multistate/multinational corporations remains a mess 
(emphasis added).” (McLure, 1986, p. 131).  Similarly, Henderson (1990) wrote, 
“This multitude of tax systems amounts to a drag on interstate trade almost as 
debilitating as the border restrictions our federal system was originally designed to 
prevent” (p. 1352).  In 2003, McLure (2003) did not have a more positive view of 
state corporation income tax.  In addressing a group in California, he stated, “The 
sales tax system, in particular, is a ‘Great Swamp,’ but the state income tax system is 
not much better—a Lesser Bog” (p. 127).  He goes on to state that state corporate 
income taxes badly need rationalization to provide greater uniformity. 
 There are several problems that arise because of a lack of uniformity in the 
taxation of interstate income.  McLure and Hellerstein (2004) list three general 
problems: adverse economic effects, excessive compliance costs, and revenue loss 
from increased opportunity for tax planning.  In addition, the existence of multiple 
state tax systems can lead to more litigation, and more legislative time devoted to tax 
law changes (Shaviro, 1993).  In the remainder of this section we consider the 
evidence on the three problems listed by Hellerstein and McLure. 
 
Economic Inefficiency  
The lack of uniformity can result in economic inefficiency.  Differences 
across states in corporate income tax systems lead to interstate differences in effective 
tax rates on the return to capital.  In equilibrium capital is expected to yield the same 
after tax rate of return in all states, thus in states with higher effective tax rates the 
before tax rate of return will be higher than in states with lower effective tax rates.  It 
follows that a revenue neutral (in the aggregate) tax reform that equalized effective 
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marginal tax rates across states would be welfare enhancing.  (It is assumed that the 
aggregate capital stock does not change as result of the reform.)  In addition, the 
interstate differences in state corporate tax systems can also result in differences in 
effective marginal tax rates by industry and perhaps by type of firm.  This adds to the 
welfare loss.   
Shaviro (1993) largely bases his case for uniformity in interstate taxation on 
the problem of location distortions that are caused by interstate differences in tax 
rates.  He argues that interstate tax disparities have the same effect as an outright 
tariff, something prohibited by the Constitution. 
To the best of our knowledge, no one has attempted to estimate the magnitude 
of this welfare loss.  However, Sørensen (2001) has estimated the welfare loss from 
differences in effective corporate tax rates across countries in the European Union.  
He employed a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze a revenue 
neutral (within each country) tax reform that eliminated differences across countries 
in the effective corporate income tax rate and replaced them by a uniform rate 
throughout the EU, namely the population weighted current marginal tax rates.  He 
finds that such uniformity would increase welfare by 0.16 to 0.35 percent of GDP, an 
amount he notes to be “disappointingly small.”   
Given that effective marginal tax rates within the EU are much larger than 
those for U.S. state corporation income taxes, and that differences in tax rates across 
the EU are likely to be larger than interstate differences within the U.S., the welfare 
gain from such a reform in the U.S. would likely be even smaller than what Sørensen 
estimates for the EU.28 
A second economic effect from the lack of coordination of state corporate 
income taxes is tax competition.  Wilson (1999), Wildasin and Wilson (2001), Oates 
(2001), and Zodrow (2003) provide reviews of this literature.  As Zodrow points out, 
the implications of the tax competition literature are mixed, and thus “it is difficult to 
draw unambiguous conclusions regarding their implications for corporate tax 
coordination…” (p. 660).  The implications of the basic tax competition model, for 
                                                          
28This conclusion needs to be tempered since the use of an apportionment formula complicates the 
effect of corporate taxes on the return to capital and other factors.  See McLure (1981). 
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example, Oates (1972), is that tax competition leads to a “race to the bottom” in terms 
of tax rates on capital.  Thus, in the absence of tax harmonization public services 
would be underprovided.  This result is driven by the assumption that the stock of 
capital is fixed.  Other tax competition models yield contrary implications. 
These two economic welfare effects of tax harmonization depend on 
equalizing effective marginal tax rates across states.  But the uniformity that has 
generally been sought in the U.S. focuses on features of state corporate income taxes 
other than the tax rates.  If states are free to set their own tax rates, or even to provide 
subsidies to businesses outside the state corporate income tax structure, then any 
potential welfare improvement from uniformity is likely to be very small.   
 
Compliance Costs 
A second major concern regarding the lack of uniformity is the cost of tax 
compliance.  The differences in state corporate tax systems lead to the need to keep 
duplicative records, to know about a host of different rules and interpret their 
application, to file multiple tax returns, and to be subject to multiple audits.  It is 
generally assumed that the lack of conformity leads to unreasonable compliance 
costs.  Yet we were able to identify only two studies of the effect of the lack of 
uniformity on compliance costs.   
The first study, conducted by the Willis Commission, was an extensive 
investigation of corporate income tax compliance costs, as well as sales tax 
compliance cost.  Table 2 shows the distribution of compliance cost as a share of total 
firm receipts for the corporate income tax.  There is a wide range of cost, but for 75 
percent of the 100 firms in their sample the range of compliance cost was from 0.01 
percent to 0.2 percent of receipts (p. 356).   
The Willis Commission noted that individual firm estimates of compliance 
costs are consistent with the estimates from the Willis Commission’s cost study.  The 
report goes on to say that compliance costs are high for some firms but those cases 
seem to be rare.   The report concludes that compliance costs, when compared to 
gross receipts “do not appear to be very significant for most companies” (p. 383).  
And  the  Commission  goes  on  to  state,  “Indeed,  there  has  been   some   business 
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TABLE 2.  COMPLIANCE COSTS 
Costs/Receipts Number of Firms 
---- 5 
1/1000 of 1% or less 2 
2/1000 of 1% 2 
5/1000 of 1%  10 
1/100 of 1%  12 
2/100 of 1%  14 
5/100 of 1%  26 
1/10 of 1%  13 
2/10 of 1% 9 
½ of 1% 3 
1% of more 4 
Total 100 
Source: Willis Commission Report, p. 356 
 
 
acknowledgement that the present operation of the income tax system is not too 
expensive” (p. 383). 
 More recent estimates of the cost of complying with state corporate income 
taxes are provided by Gupta and Mills (2003).  For their sample, the average cost of 
complying with state corporate income taxes is $258,000 in 1991 dollars.29  For the 
251 firms that report both compliance cost and state income tax liabilities, 
compliance cost is 2.9 percent of taxes and 0.022 percent of sales.  Gupta and Mills 
use these values to estimate that the aggregate compliance cost for the state corporate 
income tax for the largest 1000 firms in the Compustat database is $334 million for 
1995. 
 Gupta and Mills note that the compliance cost for the federal corporate 
income  tax  is  1.4  percent  of  tax  liability,  or less than half the percentage for state 
corporate income taxes.  They state that this provides “prima facie evidence of the 
impact of disconformity in state tax rules” (p. 363).   Gupta and Mills also estimate 
the effect on compliance cost of the number of returns filed and find that a one 
percent increase in the number of returns increases compliance cost by 0.04 percent.  
At the 25th percentile of all variables, the effect of adding one more return is to 
increase compliance cost by $8,000.   
                                                          
29Gupta and Mills (2003) use the data from Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) and Slemrod (1997). 
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As a share of receipts, the estimates from the Willis Commission are much 
larger than those reported by Gupta and Mills.  We do not necessarily believe that it 
would be appropriate to conclude that this implies that compliance costs have 
decreased.  While advances in technology has no doubt lead to a reduction in the cost 
of maintaining records, etc., differences in the methodologies by which compliance 
costs were measured may account for the differences.   
 
Over- and Under-Apportionment 
Finally, many authors have suggested that differences in state corporate 
income tax systems can lead to inequities in tax payments in the sense that 
corporations could be taxed on more or less than their total profits.  The focus of this 
over- or under-apportionment is on the non-uniformity of apportionment formulas 
across states.  There are two studies of this issue that we are aware of.   
Sheffrin and Fulcher (1984) calculated state taxable profits using three 
formulas that differed by the weight of the payroll and sales factors.  The three 
formulas used were: a 100 percent sales factor; a 100 percent payroll factor; and a 
formula with weights of 2/3rd for the payroll factor and 1/3rd for the sales factor.  The 
authors did not have property value, so they double weighted payroll in the third 
formula to account for that.  
Clearly, if all states used the same formula, then 100 percent of corporate 
profits would be taxed.  Sheffrin and Fulcher assumed that each state adopted the 
formula that produced the maximum tax revenue and calculated the amount of 
corporate profit that would be taxed by the states, and then compared this to the 
actual total profit for 1980.  They found that taxed profit was 6.14 percent higher than  
actual profit.  The same experiment for 1977 yielded an over-apportionment of 4.5 
percent. 
This overstates the likely over-apportionment since all states do not adopt a 
formula that maximizes revenue.  (Moreover, federal PL 86-272 affords nexus 
protection to firms for which the only contact with a state is the solicitation of sales.)  
If each state adopted the revenue maximization formula in 1977 and had that same 
formula in 1980, Sheffrin and Fulcher find that over-apportionment in 1980 would be 
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only 3.6 percent.  They conclude that over-apportionment is not a major issue, and 
note that this result is consistent with the Willis Commission’s finding that the choice 
of formula is not an issue involving a lot of money.   
Sheffrin and Fulcher conducted a further experiment in which they allowed a 
state to choose a different formula for each industry (defined mainly as two-digit SIC 
industries) in the state that maximizes the tax revenue from that industry.  In this case 
they find that over-apportionment amounts to 17.1 percent for 1980 and 15.3 percent 
for 1977.  Over-apportionment does differ by industry, with over-apportionment 
being high for natural resource and manufacturing industries and low for other 
industries.  For example, they calculate that for oil and gas extraction the over-
apportionment would be 51.0 percent (which is toward the upper end) and for the 
paper industry it would be 17.6 percent (which is at the lower end for manufacturing), 
while for communication it would be 8.8 percent (which is about the median for other 
industries).  Since states do not adopt separate formulas for each industry, the results 
of the exercise clearly over state the degree of over-apportionment.  
The exercise by Sheffrin and Fulcher assumes that each state takes the firm’s 
total profit (for example federal taxable income) and apportions it.  But states adopt 
unique provisions that alter federal taxable income in converting it to state taxable 
income.  These changes could result in larger or smaller over-apportionment.  In 
practice the pressures of interjurisdictional competition probably biases policy toward 
smaller over-apportionment if not under-apportionment.   
 Lopez and Martinez-Vazquez (1997) estimated the degree of over- and under-
apportionment of corporate profits for different business sectors resulting from 
heterogeneous apportionment formulas.  Their procedure is to simulate each state’s 
actual apportionment formula for 20 2-digit manufacturing industries for the years 
1972 to 1987.  The time period allows them to account for changes in the value of the 
factors and in the formula. They find that the profits of these industries were under-
apportioned by an average of 4.5 percent over the period.  With the exception of 
tobacco and textile mills, all industries were under-apportioned.  Tobacco was over-
apportioned by an average of 1.45 percent, while textile mills were over-apportioned 
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by an average of 0.8 percent.  The results hold for sub-periods.  When they added 
throwback rules, the results change marginally, but are qualitatively the same. 
These two studies suggest that over-apportionment may not be an important 
issue empirically.  But is there an equity issue in principle?  Is it unfair for a 
corporation to be taxed on more than 100 percent of its profits?  We can think of 
fairness in this case as treating two identical corporations the same, i.e., one can apply 
the principle of horizontal equity.  In any case, do differences in apportionment 
formula violate the principal of horizontal equity?  We do not think it would be 
considered unfair that a firm doing all of its business in one state pays more in state 
corporate income taxes than a firm with the same profit but located in another state 
with a higher tax rate.  Furthermore, we do not think it would be considered unfair if 
all states used the same apportionment formula but had different tax rates, and as a 
result a multistate corporation that did business in the high-tax state paid more taxes 
than an equivalent corporation doing business in a low-tax state. 
Now suppose that there are two states with the same tax rate but different 
apportionment formulas.  Suppose there are two equivalent corporations engaged in 
the two states and they pay the same total tax, although the tax rates may apply to 
more than 100 percent of the profits.  Now suppose one of the states adopts the same 
formula as the other state but changes it tax rate so that the two firms continue to pay 
the same total tax as before.  The taxes paid in the later case are no different than the 
former case when the states had different apportionment formulas.  But we suggested 
above that the later case would be considered fair, so the former case must also be 
fair.  If there are corporations with the same profit but engage in business in a 
different way in the two states, the corporations are not equivalent, so the principle of 
horizontal equity does not apply.  Thus, we don't think that the issue of over-
apportionment is an equity issue.  But the resulting differences in effective tax rates 
may have implications for efficiency. 
In summary, it appears that the common view is that the lack of uniformity is 
a serious problem.  This conclusion is based on 1) the writings on state corporate 
income tax that make this claim, 2) that the concern over uniformity is long standing, 
and 3) that great effort has been made over a long period to achieve uniformity.  
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Certainly uniformity of state corporate income taxes would be preferred to non-
uniformity.  But the evidence that exists does not seem to suggest that the system is 
“debilitating,” as Henderson (1990) suggests.  The empirical evidence is sparse and 
not comprehensive, but it does suggest that the rhetoric may need to be toned down 
and that more research needs to be conducted.   
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5.  Is Cooperation Feasible? A Theoretical Framework 
Analysis of a voluntary tax compact and its effectiveness begs the question of 
whether states would cooperate with respect to the design of a corporate tax system.  
This section presents a simple framework in which to consider whether states will 
mutually agree on some proposed tax provision.  The results are not encouraging.  
For simplicity, assume that a state will either adopt, denoted A, or not adopt, denoted 
NA, a proposed provision and it does so based on the net benefits from adopting 
relative to not adopting the provision.  Not adopting a proposed provision means the 
state will maintain the status quo.  Consider a state j and let k represent the other state 
(or all other states).  We consider whether the states will mutually agree on the tax 
provision by framing the decision in a 2 x 2 payoff matrix.  Figure 2 is the payoff 
matrix for state j, where B represents the net payoff for state j and the subscripts  
represent the decisions of j and k respectively.  We assume that states follow Nash 
behavior, that is, each state acts on the assumption that what the other state has done 
is given. 
 
FIGURE 2: PAYOFF MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are four cases of the relationships between net benefits that should be 
considered.  For Case 1, BNA,A > BA,A > BNA,NA .   If this condition holds for both 
states, then we have a classic prisoner’s dilemma game, and if each state follows 
Nash behavior, equilibrium will be for no state to adopt the proposed provision.   
 For Case 2, BA,A > BA,NA  ≥ BNA,NA.  In this case benefits are higher if both 
states adopt the provision then if either or both do not adopt.  However, if just state j 
adopts the provision, the net benefit to state j will be smaller, but not less than if 
neither state adopts the provision.  If this condition holds for both states, we expect 
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that states should be willing to agree to adopt the provision.  And, if BA,NA is strictly 
greater than BNA,NA  for both states, then the adoption of the proposed policy is the 
dominant strategy for both states.    
 For Case 3, BNA,A = BA,A,,  the state is indifferent between adopting and not 
adopting the provision.   Case 4 is the situation for which BA,A < BNA,A   ≤ BNA,NA.  In 
this case not adopting the proposed provision would be the preferred option.  While 
the expected outcome for Cases 1 and 4 are the same, Case 4 is not a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. 
 If the ranking of benefits is the same for both states, then only for Cases 2 and 
3 will both states agree to adopt the provision.  In the other two cases, neither state 
will adopt if they act independently.  However, in Case 1 mutual cooperation could 
yield adoption by both.  If the ranking of benefits differ between the states, then both 
states will adopt only if Case 2 represents the ordering of benefits for one state and 
Case 3 represents the ordering for the other state.  A state represented by Case 2 or 
Case 3 will adopt regardless of the decision of the other state.  A state represented by 
Case 1 or Case 4 will not adopt the provision regardless of the decision of the other 
state.  
The benefits to a state from adopting a provision as opposed to maintaining 
the status quo may consist of changes in tax revenue, in state tax administrative 
expense, in compliance cost for firms, or in the employment level.  These might be 
appropriately labeled as economic benefits.   
In addition to these economic benefits, there are more political or psychic 
factors that may affect the decision of whether to adopt.  It is possible that a state 
views changing its regulations or policies as undesirable, for example the bureaucracy 
may not want to be bothered with having to change procedures required by the 
proposed provision.  The state might put a relatively high value on maintaining its 
autonomy and thus does not want to agree to conform.  Of course, in that case the 
state could adopt the provision while maintaining the freedom to modify or discard 
the provision in the future.  The state may have a strong preference for its current 
provision and thus does not want to change.  For example, perhaps the current 
provision is associated with an important official who has a personal or emotional 
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attachment to it.  The current, adopted provision presumably was the result of some 
political process in which the proposed provision could have been adopted.  Thus, 
generally to change from the current provision to the proposed provision will entail 
some political cost, although the cost will depend on the nature and magnitude of the 
change. 
Finally, it is not clear how the state will aggregate the different benefits.  For 
example, while states should prefer lower compliance cost for firms, ceteris paribus, 
it is not clear that the state would weight this benefit the same as, say, increased 
revenue.  The weight the state places on a particular benefit no doubt depends on the 
political pressure interstate and intrastate businesses bring to bear on the subject.  For 
example, a state may adopt an apportionment formula with a heavier weighted sales 
factor even if tax revenue decreases as a result if the change reduces the tax liability 
of important firms located in the state and they exert political pressure on the state to 
adopt the change.  A similar case would be a proposal to apportion certain income, 
for example, royalty income, that is opposed by firms that have allocated such 
income to states with low or non-existent taxes on such income. 
The net benefits will depend on the nature of the tax provision, and in 
particular whether the proposed provision involves tax policy or tax regulations.  An 
example of the former would be a proposal for a specific apportionment formula, 
while an example of the later would be a proposal for a common sales tax reporting 
form.  We expect tax policy proposals to involve larger net benefits (either positive or 
negative) and larger political pressure than tax regulation proposals. 
Consider a proposal to adopt a common apportionment formula, say, the 3-
factor formula and that initially all states agree to that.  Suppose that state j 
determines that it could increase its tax revenue by shifting to a different formula, say 
a single factor sales formula.  This suggests that the situation is described by Case 1 
or Case 4.  Such an increase in revenue might occur if the state is a “market region.”  
But it is not feasible for all states to be “market regions” and thus to benefit from 
shifting to the same formula.  Assuming there are two formulas, then state k must be 
reflected by Case 2.  Thus, state k would retain the 3-factor formula, while state j 
would switch to the single factor formula. 
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But the switch to another formula may instead be driven by economic 
development consideration.  Edmiston (2002) studied the effects of shifting to a 
formula that weights sales more heavily.  He finds that it is advantageous in terms of 
the level of economic activity for a state to independently adopt a double-weighted 
sales factor formula, but when all states adopt a more heavily weighted sales formula 
there are winners and losers.  In other words, he finds Case 1, i.e., a prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
Proposed regulations as opposed to proposed policies are unlikely to have 
much effect on revenue, but could make compliance easier for firms or might reduce 
the state’s administrative burden.  Such proposals probably fall into Case 2, where 
there is significant benefit if all states adopt the proposal.  Thus, it seems that 
obtaining uniformity on tax regulation issues will be much easier than on tax policy.   
There is a substantial literature on the theory of cooperation within a game-
theoretic framework.  While a discussion of this literature is beyond the focus of this 
paper, we present some ideas or concepts from that literature that we believe are 
relevant to the issue of cooperation among states on MTC proposed provisions.   
Suppose that for a proposed provision one state falls into Case 1 or Case 4, 
while the other state falls into Case 2 or Case 3.  In this case there is no common 
policy adopted if states act non-cooperatively.  There are two possible approaches to 
reaching agreement in this situation.  One is to compensate the state whose benefit of 
adopting the proposed provision is negative.  This would seem to be difficult to carry 
out, particularly if the compensation would have to be paid every year that the state 
agreed to the proposal.  A second approach is to bundle provisions, some of which 
yield positive benefits sufficient to offset the negative benefits from other proposals.  
This form of logrolling would work only if the adoption of the bundled proposal was 
all or nothing.  But it would be relatively easy for a state to adopt some parts of the 
bundled proposal but not others.   
The more difficult situation is when both states are represented by Case 1.  
Axelrod has written extensively on game theory, including cooperation.  In The 
Evolution of Cooperation,  Alexrod (1984) addresses the question, under what 
conditions will cooperation emerge when the payoffs are represented by Case 1?  
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Certainly for a prisoner’s dilemma game that is played one time by selfish individuals 
not cooperating is the dominant strategy.  Axelrod argues that cooperation can occur 
if the players in such a game might meet again, that is, if the game is played 
repeatedly.  In such iterated prisoner’s dilemma games experiments have shown that 
cooperative behavior is possible.  For example, a Tit for Tat strategy yields 
cooperative behavior.   
In an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game there is a series of payoffs, but future 
payoffs are worth less than current payoffs.  Key to a cooperative outcome is that the 
weights players assign to future outcomes are large enough.  Axelrod illustrates this 
with two examples.  Consider two firms that do business with one another.  The 
willingness of the supplier to provide credit to the buyer would fall if there was a 
high probably that the buyer would go into bankruptcy, which means that the weight 
on future payoffs is low.  Likewise the willingness of two legislators to cooperate 
would be affected if one of them was unlikely to be re-elected. 
What does this suggest about how cooperation among states might be 
increased?  Since cooperation is premised on reciprocity, it would be important for 
the players to have frequent interactions, even outside the “game.”   The problem here 
in the context of the MTC is that there is not a “player” from each state.  Rather, the 
decision of whether to adopt a proposed policy provision is made by the state’s 
elected representatives, most of whom do not participate in interactions with 
representatives from other states within the context of the MTC.  In making a 
decision, a representative considers the political cost of the decision relative to the 
gain from cooperation.  While the threat of retaliation by other states will reduce the 
benefits to the state, voters are unlikely to blame the representative.   
For cooperation to result in an iterative prisoner’s dilemma game, the threat 
of retaliation, i.e., of defecting, must be effective.  With a Tit for Tat strategy if one 
player defects, then the other player will also defect, resulting in lower payoffs for 
both players.  The first player “learns” that cooperation is better.  But with 50 states 
the threat of retaliation is not likely to be very effective.  Suppose that one state does 
not adopt a proposed policy.  To have real retaliation, the other 49 states would have 
to defect.  If only one state defects, the benefits to the other 49 states from 
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maintaining cooperation may fall as a result, but the benefits may be much higher 
than if they all defect.  Thus, this situation is not like the traditional prisoner’s 
dilemma game in which the payoff to the person who does not defect is much lower 
than if they both defect. 
The threat could also come from an external force.  In particular, if the federal 
government threatened some action if states did not cooperate, and if the effect of the 
action was sufficiently large, then the payoff matrix could change in such a way that 
not adopting a proposed policy is no longer a dominant strategy.  However, if the 
federal government would not take the action if a few states did not adopt the 
proposed policy, then some states might decide they could free-ride and thus not 
adopt the policy. 
Of course, it is possible that players do not behave as selfish utility 
maximizers.  For example, players may be altruistic, or engage in what Ernst Fehr 
and Armin Falk  (2002) refer to as “reciprocal fairness”.  Fehr and Falk show that 
participants in experiments do show evidence of reciprocal fairness and that 
cooperation is possible within a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
What is implied by the above discussion is that cooperation is difficult to 
achieve for most of the major tax policy proposals, and that significant non-
uniformity in state corporate tax systems exists should not be a surprise.  The 
problem is not that all proposed provisions are represented by a prisoner’s dilemma.  
Rather, for many proposed policies some states would benefit from adoption while 
others would not, that is, some states are represented by Case 2 or Case 3, while 
others are represented by Case 4.  In those situations there will be conformity among 
some, but not all states.   
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6.  Expectations of Compacts 
 Helping to explain why interstate cooperation is difficult to achieve is the fact 
that state governments in America guard their independence, from the competitive 
behavior of other states and from the intrusive power of the federal government.  The 
ease of labor and capital movement fosters competition among states for economic 
growth and development. Despite these pressures (and the points made in section 5), 
joint state action is possible. Compacts offer a means for dealing with problems that 
are beyond the “jurisdictional reach of any one state” (Zimmerman & Wendell, 1951, 
p. 5). 
Federalism also embraces tension between the national government and the 
states. There is a risk to the federal structure, however, if a group of states can 
organize in a way that diminishes the national government’s powers.  Accordingly, 
the Compact Clause (Article I, Section 10) of the United States Constitution declares 
that “…no State shall, without the consent of Congress…enter into any agreement or 
compact with another State….”  A similar provision was included in the earlier 
Articles of Confederation, with the first compact consummated between two states 
without Congressional approval two years before the U.S. Constitution was drafted.  
From this auspicious start, interstate compacts and agreements are now a 
staple of interstate cooperation.  There are an estimated 192 interstate compacts 
covering a variety of national and regional matters (Bowman, 2004). Depending on 
the compact’s scope and purpose, it can be administered informally through the 
actions of the respective states or more formally by an active administrative body or 
commission with powers delegated to it by the member states.  The first compact 
with its own administrative body is the regional compact termed the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey – officially the Port of New York Authority Compact  – 
that facilitates commerce and development within 25 miles of the Statue of Liberty 
(Zimmerman, 2002).  Created in 1921 with Congressional consent, the Port 
Authority, among other things, operates port and rail facilities and runs the three 
major international airports in the area, and it was the owner of the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center. An example of a national compact in which most states 
participate, but without a specially created administrative body, is the Interstate 
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Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers (Zimmerman, 2002). In 
this case, compact administration is left up to each state’s parole and probation 
agencies, not a separate interstate commission agency.  Thus, there are compacts with 
and those without administrative commissions. The Multistate Tax Compact created 
an administrative entity.  
Read literally, the Compact Clause would require the states to obtain 
congressional approval before entering into any agreement with themselves. This 
interpretation was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee 
(1893, p. 519) in ruling that the “application of the Compact Clause is limited to 
agreements that are directed to the formation of any combination tending to the 
increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with 
the just supremacy of the United States.” 
In 1978, the Court faced the same question when corporate taxpayers 
challenged the constitutionality of the Multistate Tax Compact which was entered 
into by certain states without congressional approval.  The Court, in U.S. Steel Corp 
et al. v. Multistate Tax Commission stated that it was “reluctant … to circumscribe 
modes of interstate cooperation that do not enhance state power to the detriment of 
federal supremacy” (p. 460).  Despite any enhanced political influence afforded by 
the “strength in numbers and organization” (p. 479), the Court judged that the states 
were not organized in a way that encroached upon or interfered with national 
supremacy.  Although the Court recognized that states could gain “some incremental 
increase in the bargaining power” against corporations and that “…. [g]roup action in 
itself may be more influential than independent actions by the States….[t]his pact 
does not purport to authorize the member States to exercise any powers they could 
not exercise in its absence.”  Moreover, the Court dismissed claims by taxpayers that 
the Compact sanctioned a “campaign of harassment” against taxpayers by inducing 
member states to issue “burdensome requests” for documents and issuing “arbitrary 
assessments” against taxpayers who refused to comply. As the Court pointed out, 
only the individual states, not the Multistate Tax Commission, could issue a tax 
assessment, and, besides, such issues were irrelevant to the facial validity of the 
Compact.  For these and other reasons, the Court upheld the constitutionally of the 
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Multistate Tax Compact despite the lack of Congressional approval.  Thus, within the 
meaning of the Compact Clause, the Multistate Tax Compact is not an “agreement or 
compact.” 
 
Assessing Compacts in General 
 Compacts, in general, and the MTC, in particular, face challenges as an 
“instrumentality of state policy” (Leach and Sugg, 1959).  The literature on compacts 
mainly centers on legal, administrative, and political perspectives.  There are case 
studies of particular compacts and general discussions of interstate cooperation.  
Weissert and Hill (1994, p. 29) find compacts as the “quintessential 
intergovernmental solution.” Dimock and Benson, in their 1937 pamphlet Can 
Interstate Compacts Succeed? conclude generally in the affirmative because 
compacts are “an important part of the machinery of American federalism.” From the 
extant literature on compacts, four key concerns persist. 
States cede power. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the contention that states 
lose power through the Multistate Tax Compact because states retain all their 
sovereign powers and responsibilities. Ridgeway (1971, p. 298) contents that this 
“strict legal view…ignores the political side of the matter” by tying one state to the 
actions of others.  In addition, the MTC permits states to select from a smorgasbord 
of services – a form of pick-and-chose tax approach to tax policy and tax 
administration.  One would not think this is the modus operandi of a controlling 
entity over state behavior.  
Lack of oversight. A criticism of compacts is the lack of periodic review by 
the member states or Congress (Ridgeway, 1971).  Dixon (1965) even calls interstate 
compacts “headless” because they are partially insulated from both legislative and 
executive branches. States fund the MTC through yearly assessments that may be 
buried in the budgets of revenue departments and accepted as a matter of course by 
budget reviewers (both executive and legislative).  In one sense, this constitutes 
yearly acceptance by the state of the role of the MTC since a state could withhold its 
payment.  The other Compact members, however, could have legal standing under 
contract impairment theory (Hardy, 1982) to contest this action, but the results of 
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such state-against-state litigation could harm future MTC interactions. Barton (1965, 
p. 169) concludes that compact commissions have “no power to tax and thus are 
dependent upon the states for annual appropriations [which] renders them responsive 
to the states rather than to any regional constituency.”  This dependence theory 
protects the states. In fact, states have formal and informal controls over the Compact 
and Commission activities in particular.30  Formal controls include but are not limited 
to gubernatorial control over the state’s representative, continued state funding, and, 
ultimately, repeal of the Compact itself.  Informal controls include, in part, the 
Compact’s requirement for annual reports, audited financial statements, public 
participation, and the overall need for Commission solvency. While a state can 
formally exit the Compact only by repealing its original legislation authorizing the 
Compact, it can avoid adopting legislation or policy that might be necessary to 
implement particular MTC policy preferences.  Few states engage in any form of 
periodic, systematic evaluation of their participation in interstate compacts 
(Florestano, 1994).  In contrast, an organized group of taxpayers (i.e., COST) 
continues to demonstrate a willingness and ability to monitor and aggressively mount 
challenges to MTC activities that are perceived to be injurious to taxpayer interests. 
This form of market monitoring has been successful in limiting MTC’s actions, such 
as in the recent efforts by COST to keep MTC from having an administrative role 
regarding the proposed compact known as the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement. 
Goal succession. Upon meeting its original goal, an organization can expand 
its coverage in order to perpetuate itself.  To the Supreme Court in U.S. Steel Corp. et 
al. v. Multistate Tax Commission (1978), the MTC is a means “to facilitate 
uniformity of taxation by member states of the income of interstate businesses and to 
avoid duplicative taxation.” Armed with such  a broad goal, MTC’s wide range of 
programs confirm the dynamic nature of the original goal, negating the need for goal 
                                                          
30Based on the ideas outlined in Dixon (1965, footnote 106). 
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succession.31  The MTC’s “Federalism at Risk” program highlights the range of 
activities that fall under the ambit of the MTC’s goal. 
The few control the many. The concern is that a few people, such as the full-
time staff administering a compact, could seek to skew the work beyond the confines 
of the original agreement among the member states. To Leach and Sugg (1959), a 
successful compact requires the services of “a small group of dedicated” staff and 
member representatives.  Given that state revenue secretaries are the state 
representatives to the MTC, and they come and go with gubernatorial whims and 
elections, the growth of MTC participating states over time provides an indication 
that member states are relatively satisfied with the MTC and its direction.  Another 
indicator of dedication is the long length of service of the two MTC executive 
directors -- Gene Corrigan from 1969 to 1988 (Brunori, 1999) and Dan Bucks from 
1988 to 2005 (Brunori, 2000).  While steady leadership at the helm of an organization 
like the Multistate Tax Commission provides continuity, the coming and going of 
numerous individuals who have populated the voting slots at the Commission have 
made the MTC, in essence, a succession of ‘different’ organizations over the MTC’s 
nearly 38 years of existence.  Still, the Compact’s purpose of “promoting uniformity” 
has provided a never changing goal. 
 
Evaluating Interstate Compact ‘Commissions’ 
 In a political science dissertation, Hill (1992) conducts the only known 
systematic study of the effectiveness of interstate compact commissions.  As such, the 
study excluded compacts that did not have a central administrative entity, or 
commission. Hill’s study, in particular, focuses on water compact commissions. First, 
Hill posits a theoretical evaluation framework for compact commissions based upon 
the organizational effectiveness literature.  This theory allows Hill to identify 
‘effective’ interstate water compact commissions based upon a survey of compact 
                                                          
31The MTC audited financial statements for June 30, 2003 and 2002 indicate the following 
projects and activities: cooperative auditing; automation plan; enterprise automation project; 
national nexus program; nexus activities; nexus education; 4R project; deregulation program; and, 
TaxNet. 
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directors and commissioners. Hill then validates those theory-driven results against 
what the literature characterizes as an effective compact.   
 Hill frames his work in the organizational effectiveness literature, but finds 
no single way to measure compact commission effectiveness.  Instead, he adopts 
multiple criteria based on three organizational approaches: the goal model; the 
system-resource model; and, the strategic constituencies model.   
First, the goal model assumes an organization is “deliberate, rational, [and] 
goal-seeking” so the focus is on the “accomplishment of ends rather than the means 
of attaining them” (p. 100).  Compacts, in particular, “have a finite number of legally 
defined goals in the compact instrument developed by a consensus among the 
compacting states … so there is an historical basis for assessing how well the 
compact commissions have performed their statutory goals” (p. 100).  The MTC, in 
particular, faces competing goals of state sovereignty and multistate tax uniformity.   
 Hill’s system-resource model addresses the means, not the ends, of a 
compact. Specifically, this model recognizes that goals cannot be attained without 
sufficient funding of the compact commission.  “State support of a compact is also a 
good indicator of the compacting states’ assessments of the commission’s 
effectiveness in terms of doing what the states cannot do for themselves” (p. 101).  
As demonstrated in Figure 1 discussed above, the MTC’s budget (and, by extension, 
other income-producing activities) have grown over the years.  It remains to be seen 
if the resources devoted are sufficient or efficiently deployed. 
 A constituency model represents Hill’s third theoretical framework for 
compact commission effectiveness.  This model rests on the power of external 
interests with their own goals in influencing an organization.  External influence is 
especially relevant for a compact commission given that it operates in the political 
arena. For the MTC, the constituency test fits if for no other reason than the variation 
in formal state participation and the active monitoring by COST. 
 Hill uses these three theoretical models to develop variables measurable by 
survey results that permit him to characterize water compact commissions’ 
effectiveness.  Hill isolates two goal model variables—overall effectiveness and goal 
impact—as assessed by the compact commission executive director.  Two systems-
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resource model variables—funding adequacy and state burden sharing—are also 
based on the executive director’s assessment.  Four strategic constituencies model 
variables, all based on responses from commission members, focused on overall 
effectiveness, goal impact, specific state actions, and goal consensus.  Based upon 
these results, Hill generated a list of ‘effective’ and ‘not effective’ water compact 
commissions.   
Hill sought to validate his theory-derived listing of effective water compact 
commissions against seven characteristics of effective compacts – he calls them 
hypotheses – drawn from the general literature on interstate compacts and on water 
compacts in particular.  According to Hill (1992, pp. 114-115), the literature suggests 
that an effective interstate compact commission must have:  
• “coercive authority to force compliance with compact goals” 
• “origins…traced to either a federal initiative or a crises that precipitated the 
development of a compact” 
• “formal participation of the federal government” 
• no “one state veto voting power” 
• “a high degree of communication among its member states” 
• “elite constituencies” 
• “flexibility.”  
These seven literature-based criteria for an effective interstate compact 
commission can serve as one way to assess the MTC’s effectiveness.  
Being able to force compliance with the goals of the compact is Hill’s first 
element of an effective interstate compact.  (As made clear in section 5 above, 
voluntary cooperation is difficult to achieve, suggesting that forced compliance may 
be necessary to obtain agreement among all states.)  Even in the context of interstate 
water compacts in which Hill formulated his hypotheses, however, results were at 
variance with this expectation.  As he pointed out, coercive power may not be needed 
when compact activities are of high quality, where there is a close working 
relationship and respect among members, and where persuasion and education can 
foster acceptance of compact recommendations (Hill, 1992, pp. 153-156).  Hill relies 
on Leach and Sugg (1959) for the high quality of work concept.  To Leach and Sugg 
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(1959, p. 213), an effective compact clearly defines the terms of its commission and 
that body stays focused and does not try to “do too much.” 
The MTC cannot force compliance with the goals of the Compact.  As Hardy 
(1982) notes, an interstate compact is both a statute and a contract.  Therefore, the 
terms of this relationship means that a member state could seek redress against the 
actions of another member(s) for any contract impairment.  Hill concludes that 
effective compacts have no post-compact litigation among its members.  We know of 
no state-against-state legal action pertaining to MTC activities. This is despite the fact 
that states are heterogeneous with notable differences in political culture, economy, 
and the domicile of multistate taxpayers.   
Instead, the compact was challenged by major taxpayers as an 
unconstitutional agreement among the states given that the Compact did not have 
Congressional approval as specified by the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
In U.S. Steel Corp. et al. v. Multistate Tax Commission (1978), the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the MTC as not enhancing state power at the expense of federal 
supremacy.  
Hill’s second criterion is that a federal initiative or a crisis must precipitate 
creation of the compact for it to be effective.  In fact, events that propelled the 
creation of the MTC included the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in 
Northwestern Portland Cement v. Minnesota, the enactment later that year of Public 
Law 86-272, and subsequent Congressional inquiry and legislative proposals.  The 
1959 law called for a study commission (the Willis Commission) that released its 
report in 1965, which prompted additional legislative proposals to preempt state tax 
options.  In response, several associations of state officials coalesced around the 
formation of a multistate tax compact.   Although Hill found no support in his study 
of interstate water compacts for this hypothesis, it does fit the origins of the MTC.   
Hill’s third hypothesis of an effective compact is the formal participation of 
the federal government. This bias for federal participation emerges specifically from 
the geographic setting of water compacts, the subject of Hill’s study. 
The rationale for this argument is that compacts draw strength from 
federal infusions of authority, federal resources (expertise, policy 
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information, or finances become available to the commission), and 
the federal government becomes morally committed to carry out its 
water resources program in accordance with the compact plan.  In the 
case of federal-interstate compacts…federal involvement creates 
strong moral and political claims on all future Congresses, even [if] 
they are not judicially enforceable. (pp. 159-160, citations deleted) 
 
With respect to the MTC, the formal participation of the federal government 
was trumped by state concerns over sovereignty.  State sovereignty, in turn, trumped 
spillovers given the divergent interests of the states.  (See the discussion of 
sovereignty in section 9.)  There is no participation of the federal government in the 
MTC.  In fact, the MTC takes policy positions on federal issues that are perceived to 
be a threat to state tax sovereignty. For the MTC “to be viable,” Sharpe (1975, p. 
273) states that “the MTC must be independent of the federal government and 
respected by business and the states.” Therefore, the MTC fails on Hill’s federal 
participation criterion.  MTC advocates are likely to find failure here very acceptable. 
Criterion number four is the voting structure of the compact with a 
unanimous vote requirement indicative of an ineffective compact. Article VI of the 
Multistate Tax Compact specifies that the Commission is “composed of one 
‘member’ from each party State who shall be the head of the State agency charged 
with administration of the types of taxes to which this compact applies.”  There is one 
vote per state.  Moreover, Article VI states that the Commission must have a majority 
of the members present, and that it takes a majority votes for an action to be binding.  
In 1971, the MTC adopted a bylaw that requires not only a majority of states but a 
majority of the population represented by the voting members before MTC can 
approve a proposal.  As Sharpe (1975, footnote 211) notes, this provision was 
adopted only after much concern expressed by California and Pennsylvania interests.  
Thus, this provision ensures that voting states with small populations cannot coalesce 
against the larger states.  Accordingly, the MTC is an effective compact by Hill’s 
fourth standard.   
Cooperation or Competition:  The Multistate Tax  
Commission and State Corporate Tax Uniformity  
 
 
 43
Hill finds that a high degree of communications among its members is the 
fifth basis for an effective compact commission.  The amount of public information 
issued annually and the frequency of contact was used by Hill to assess interstate 
water compacts. Hill found that communication was neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for compact commission effectiveness.  Hill’s study was before 
the Internet and its tremendous opportunities for the provision of public information.  
The MTC exploits this opportunity with extensive information on the Web, even if it 
is disjointed in places.  Just based upon the types of information posted on the Web 
(newsletters, annual reports, resolutions, etc.), there are frequent communications 
with participating states.  In terms of frequency of meetings, the Web site conveys 
numerous meetings, including ones on specialized topics, with the opportunity for 
participation by teleconference.  MTC member states have many opportunities for 
close communication on relevant tax matters such as meetings of the Federation of 
Tax Administrators, the National Tax Association, and other groups of state officials.  
A high degree of “elite constituency” and participation opportunities is Hill’s 
sixth basis for an effective organization.  To Hill (1992, pp. 165-166), an elite 
constituency means a group with the political ability to influence the achievement of 
the compact commission’s goals.  Relevant constituencies would include those that 
can provide external validity and public/political support.  Under the Compact, the 
formal representatives are the respective state tax commissioners.  But, as pointed out 
in the theory of cooperation (the prior section) there is a need for frequent interactions 
among the ‘players’ from each state.  It is not the state tax commissioner who has 
final authority in a state over whether or not to adopt a proposed MTC policy. Rather, 
it is that state’s elected representatives who have the definitive vote in each state, and 
they are not formal participants in  MTC activities.  These elected officials may be 
generally supportive, absent a major controversy.  Other supportive constituencies 
include groups such as the Federation of Tax Administrators.   
For a particular business, its only direct contact with MTC may be during a 
joint tax audit – not the most inviting opportunity for a sharing of constructive ideas. 
Yet, businesses do interact and monitor the MTC through joint action.  What is now 
known as COST was originally the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of 
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State Chambers of Commerce.  As would be expected, COST is very active in 
protecting the interests of business taxpayers. Over the years, members of this ‘elite 
constituency’ have been very persuasive in getting states to repeal the Multistate Tax 
Compact or not join in the first place (Peters, 1997).  A former chair of COST 
confirms the reality of this constituency: “The interstate business community has the 
power and influence to create or destroy” (Peters, 1998). Based upon Hill’s sixth 
criterion, the MTC may be an effective interstate compact commission due to the role 
of COST.  This finding is sure to please COST. 
More challenging for MTC is how it is perceived by key constituencies. 
Sharpe (1975, p. 280) challenged MTC to “pursue policies that will gain and cement 
the support of the business and state communities before attempting to formulate tax 
solutions which, though ultimately the most rational and equitable, would be 
unacceptable to those still suspicious of its motives.”  While it is hard to know if 
businesses and states are “still suspicious of its motives,” the MTC is not free of 
distracters. 
Another aspect of the same hypothesis is the provision of public participation. 
Hill found formal methods for interest group participation an indication of an 
effective compact commission (pp. 165-166).  Achieving uniformity among states on 
a tax matter requires the MTC to engage a wide variety of interested parties in the 
drafting and vetting of ideas.  Therefore, there are public participation working 
groups that have an active role in reviewing proposed provisions.  While such 
proposals may not be adopted by the MTC, this form of public participation goes 
beyond mere information sharing events.  On the Internet, MTC (2005) provides the 
following statement regarding public participation with MTC: 
Generally, meetings of the Commission and its Committees are 
public. Persons attending public sessions need not identify 
themselves. However, some of the listed meetings may not be entirely 
public. Under the Commission's Public Participation Policy, closed 
meetings may be held in matters involving certain personnel issues 
and the acquisition/disposition of real estate, matters required by law 
to be confidential, including discussion of certain taxpayer 
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information, and some discussions with counsel over pending 
litigation. For your convenience, you may choose to contact [the]… 
Deputy Director, at [phone number], for an indication of which of the 
listed meetings may not be entirely public. Your contact, which may 
be on an anonymous basis, also permits the Commission to provide 
adequate seating. For more information concerning any meetings or 
events listed in this Calendar, please contact [the]… MTC 
Administrative Officer, at the Commission's Washington, DC 
headquarters office [phone number]. Please note that there are no 
registration fees associated with attendance at meetings of the 
Multistate Tax Commission or its committees; however, registration 
fees are charged for the Annual Meeting Seminar (and associated 
social events) and the Fall Business-Government Dialogue on State 
Tax Uniformity.32 
More specifically, MTC’s cited public participation policy provides: 
The Multistate Tax Commission exists to aid in the conduct of the 
people's business. To this end the Commission declares that its 
proceedings be conducted openly so that the public may remain 
informed.  In adopting this policy the Multistate Tax Commission 
finds and declares that it is the intent of this policy that actions of the 
Multistate Tax Commission be taken openly and that its deliberations 
be conducted openly.33 
 
There is an interesting history to MTC’s public participation policy.  Public 
debate among California’s State Board of Equalization members on the need for 
public participation predated MTC’s adoption of its public participation provisions.34  
Later,  California’s  other  tax  agency, the Franchise Tax Board (1999), called for the  
                                                          
32MTC (2005). 
33MTC (2003a). 
34California Taxpayers’ Association (1996). 
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MTC to amend its public participation policy to incorporate similar open 
meeting requirements to that required in California. California’s legislature premised 
its continued support for that state’s payments to the MTC on this and other 
accommodations.35 
 Hill’s last hypothesis focuses on a compact’s flexibility, including its ability 
to include all affected members in a geographically defined compact.  The first part 
of this flexibility hypothesis relates to the proper geographical coverage of a compact.  
While it is sensible to include all affected parties within a narrowly defined 
geographic space such as a water basin, it becomes a little more problematic for a 
national compact like the MTC.  As discussed earlier, the MTC has an inclusive 
public participation process.  
The second part of the flexibility hypothesis is the compact’s ability to adapt 
to changing circumstances in order to avoid becoming ineffective.  Hardy (1982) 
reports that a weakness of interstate compacts is that they are “too inflexible to be 
effective.” This concern relates to the purposes of the compact and the ease of 
members to make a change.   
The MTC encompasses broad purposes.  As specified earlier, the Compact’s 
specific purposes are liberal. Even broader, the MTC presents itself as “a joint agency 
of state governments established to (1) improve the fairness, efficiency and 
effectiveness of state tax systems as they apply to interstate and international 
commerce, and (2) preserve state tax sovereignty.”36   
Along with a flexible mission that can meet changing circumstances, an 
effective compact must offer members an opportunity to terminate their membership 
if state concerns and that of the compact diverge.  The Multistate Tax Compact is not 
subject to change unilaterally by a state.  In fact, a state must repeal its enabling 
legislation if it wants to exit the Compact.  The Commission is endowed with fairly 
general  and  broad  powers  to  implement  the  Compact  through  changed  by laws, 
                                                          
35California Franchise Tax Board (1999).  See Sharpe (1975, footnote 211) on California 
conditioning earlier support on a voting rule change. 
36MTC (2003b). 
Cooperation or Competition:  The Multistate Tax  
Commission and State Corporate Tax Uniformity  
 
 
 47
policies and programs.  In fact, the bylaws expanded the Compact to allow other 
forms of membership, as noted above.  The expanded scope of membership 
represents the most significant difference between the bylaws and the Compact itself.  
Short of formally withdrawing from the Compact, a state can simply not adopt a 
particular MTC policy.  States have a variety of ways to participate in the affairs of 
the MTC.  In fact, a variety of programs and services37 involve different groups of 
states (compact members, sovereign members, and other participating members).  
According to the flexibility hypothesis, the MTC meets this test of an effective 
compact commission. 
In summary, the MTC fits the effective interstate compact commission tests 
specified by Hill better than the interstate water compacts that he studied. It is not 
clear, however, that the MTC has been particularly effective in achieving its specific 
compact objectives since state sovereignty and tax uniformity are conflicting goals. 
 
Economic Criteria for Evaluating a Tax Compact  
What are the underlying economic benefits of a compact?  There is no known 
economic analysis of interstate compacts in general or a tax compact in particular. 
This lack of attention to a tax compact may arise from the fact that the MTC is 
specified as the only tax-related compact in the most recent comprehensive compact 
listing (Voit & Nitting, 1999). A framework can be offered to structure an 
understanding of the economic benefits of a tax compact such as the MTC.  The 
criteria presented here parallel the concerns over nonconformity raised by McLure 
and Hellerstein (2004) and discussed above.38    
From an efficiency perspective, a compact should seek to minimize tax 
administration and tax compliance costs.  In U.S. Steel Corp. et al. v. Multistate Tax 
Commission (1978, p. 691-692), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this point in 
saying that the Multistate Tax Compact “symbolized the recognition that, as applied 
                                                          
37The MTC audited financial statements for June 30, 2003 and 2002 indicate the following 
projects and activities: cooperative auditing; automation plan; enterprise automation project; 
national nexus program; nexus activities; nexus education; 4R project; deregulation program; and, 
TaxNet. 
38We ignore the issue of state sovereignty as it does not lend itself to economic assessment. 
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to multistate business, traditional state tax administration was inefficient and costly to 
both State and taxpayer.” Earlier the Willis Commission Report (1965) called the 
situation “a picture of a system which calls upon tax administrators to enforce the 
unenforceable, and the taxpayers to comply with the uncompliable” (Sharpe 1975, 
footnote 32).  Uniformity is an important means of minimizing tax compliance costs.  
Uniformity and interstate cooperation in administration (including examination and 
enforcement) may also produce lower costs of administration. 
A second dimension of efficiency relates to standard economic distortions.  
Differences in corporate tax structure are a source of distortion, and these efficiency 
losses can be reduced through uniformity of state tax systems.  A third and rather 
unique efficiency issue relates to the free-rider problem.  Being a compact member of 
MTC allows the state to vote on Commission matters.  But most of the other benefits 
provided by the MTC can be enjoyed with a “lesser” membership status.  In other 
words, states can nearly free ride.  In fact, in an analysis in 1999 of a bill that would 
repeal the Multistate Tax Compact in California made essentially that argument.39  
Fee-for-service activities like the joint audit program do not lend themselves to free 
riding. 
Because revenue is the objective when a state imposes a tax, a tax-related 
compact has as an underlying rationale the collection of money due under imposition 
of the levy. An incentive for non-domicile states to form the Compact was to gain 
revenue, just as the joint audit program remains one of the most successful programs 
preserving state involvement in the MTC.  The tax burden on business activity can be 
inequitable through effective tax planning practices.  The MTC provides a means of 
dealing with the planning problem in a number of ways, including uniformity 
provisions that may reduce multistate avoidance opportunities and through the joint 
audit program.  All of this begs the question of whether or not a compact should be 
created  merely  to  increase  revenue  collections.  Perhaps this is an issue that will be  
                                                          
39California Franchise Tax Board (1999).   
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addressed more directly by the paper on the proposed sales and use tax collection 
compact – better known as the Streamlined Sales Tax Program. 
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7.  Has the MTC Led to Greater Uniformity? 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the precise economic effects 
attributable to the Compact and the MTC.  As section 3 points out, the MTC engages 
in a substantial number of activities, and we make no attempt to evaluate those 
activities with the exception of uniformity.  However, it is possible to look 
qualitatively at trends in uniformity as uniformity can lead to lower efficiency losses 
associated with the tax system.  A primary goal of the Compact is the uniformity of 
state tax systems and the MTC has actively pursued this goal since inception.  There 
is good evidence that state corporate tax systems have moved toward greater 
uniformity in the last 40 years.40  At the same time significant differences remain 
across the states. 
There are at least six major ways that state corporate income tax systems may 
differ:  
• Apportionment formula.  While most states use the three factor formula for 
most industries, many states double weight the sales factor or use just a sales 
factor.  While the level of variation in the factors and their weights that 
existed at the time of the Willis Commission has decreased, differences still 
exist, and the formulas used for certain industries, such as airlines, differ 
substantially across states.  
• Definition of the factors used in the formula. There are substantial differences 
in how states measure property, sales, and payroll.  For example, while most 
states use cost for the property factor, some states use net book value, and 
states exempt different types of property.  For the sales factor, some states 
include receipts from franchise fees while others do not and there are 
differences in the treatment of services.  States also differ in what is included 
in payroll; for example some include tax-deferred compensation while others 
do not.  Finally, some states have throwback rules while most do not. 
 
                                                          
40Slemrod (2005) has investigated the complexity of state income taxes and finds that complexity 
increases with duration, although that effect is not found when he control for more political 
factors. 
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• Allocable income.  Many states have adopted UDIPTA, but there are 
substantial differences across states in legislative language defining certain 
features of the corporate tax, in particular non-business (allocable) income. 
• Definition of the taxable firm.  Some states require combined reporting for 
the unitary business but most do not; some states allow combined reporting 
while others do not. 
y Tax base.  While most states start with federal corporate taxable income, 
states make numerous and different adjustments to arrive at state taxable 
income. 
y Administrative procedures.  Different states follow different administrative 
practices, using different forms, examination procedures, and so on.  Even 
with the same corporate tax structure, differences in administrative 
procedures can lead to higher costs of compliance. 
 
Because of its broad scope—encompassing many elements of the six features 
noted above—UDITPA represents the most important uniformity initiative a state 
may adopt.  While compact members are expected to adopt UDITPA, other states 
have adopted UDITPA but have chosen not to be a member of the MTC.  By 1963, 
which is 6 years after the introduction of UDIPTA and prior to the formation of the 
MTC, only 3 of the 38 states with a corporate income tax had adopted the model tax 
law.  This increased to 29 out of the 45 states with the tax by 1975 and to 31 out of 45 
states in 1989 (ACIR, 1990).  For 2004, Healy and Schadewald (2004) reported that 
24 out of the 46 states with a corporate income tax had adopted UDIPTA, but of the 
24, only 9 adopted it without modification.  The implied decrease between 1989 and 
2004 is probably due to how the various authors categorized partial adoptions of 
UDIPTA and not actual changes in adoptions. 
Another measure of the increase in uniformity is the change in the number of 
states that have adopted the three-factor apportionment formula, although not 
necessarily with equally-weighted factors.  Weiner (1999) provides such information 
(see Table 3).  In 1929, only two of the 16 states with a corporate income tax used the 
three  factor  formula.   By 1963 that increased to 26 of the 38 states (68 percent), and  
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TABLE 3.  APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE IN USE, VARIOUS YEARS 
 ------------Number of states using each formula------------- 
 1929 1948 1953 1963 1977 1989 
 
Three factors1 
  Property-payroll-sales 
  Property-manufacturing   
      cost-sales  
 
Two factors1    
  Property-sales 
  Property-business 
  Property-manufacturing cost 
  Property-payroll 
  
One factor 
  Property 
  Manufacturing cost 
  Sales 
 
Other 
 
No formula 
Number of taxing states2 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
- 
1 
 
 
4 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
33 
17 
 
 
15 
5 
 
 
 
4 
2 
3 
- 
 
 
- 
1 
3 
 
n.a. 
 
- 
34 
 
 
16 
3 
 
 
 
3 
1 
- 
1 
 
 
- 
- 
4 
 
5 
 
- 
35 
 
 
26 
- 
 
 
 
1 
- 
- 
1 
 
 
- 
- 
2 
 
5 
 
- 
38 
 
 
41 
- 
 
 
 
1 
- 
- 
1 
 
 
- 
- 
2 
 
- 
 
- 
46 
 
 
44 
- 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
1 
 
1 
 
- 
46 
Note:  If the state uses multiple formulas, the formula is given for manufacturing companies.  
Some states may be listed more than once. Since alternative formulas may be available.  
Manufacturing costs include labor, raw materials and other manufacturing costs. 
n. a. = not applicable 
1 Not all states weight each factor equally. 
2 Including Hawaii (tax adopted in 1901), the District of Columbia (1947), and Alaska (1949), 
Michigan, which taxes on value added instead of income, uses an apportionment formula for 
purposes of the state corporate value-added tax. 
3 Montana required separate accounting in 1929.  Georgia and Oregon had recently adopted the 
state income tax and had not yet specified the formula. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Table 9C.1 in Annex 2c, “Tax Coordination and Competition in the 
United States of America, “in The Ruding Report (1992), p. 433. 
 
 
by 1977, to 41 out of 46 states (89 percent); in 1989, 44 of the 46 states (96 percent) 
used the formula.  In 1993, 43 states used a three factor formula, with 24 states 
equally weighting the factors and 19 double weighting the sales factor.  Of the other 
three states, two used just sales.  In 2005, 14 states used equally weighted factors and 
23 states used double weighed sales; of the other 9 states, 4 used only sales, while the 
other 5 states more than doubled the weight on the sales factor.41  The share of states 
                                                          
41See Federation of Tax Administrators (2005). 
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using the three-factor formula stood at only 30 percent in 2005, falling precipitously 
from its peak of 96 percent in 1989.  This illustrates the way in which other state 
policy objectives—notably economic development—can interfere with achieving the 
goal of uniformity.  While there has been deviation from the three-factor formula 
specified by UDITPA there is now greater uniformity around sales-weighted 
apportionment. 
 Uniformity trends for several dimensions of corporate tax structure are 
reported in Table 4 for those states with a corporate tax.  The first panel of the table 
emphasizes trends in state conformity with the federal corporate income tax between 
1967 and 2005.  In all but one instance—the adoption of federal bonus 
depreciation—there is clear evidence of greater uniformity across states.  While most 
states no longer adhere to federal bonus depreciation provisions, there remains 
considerable uniformity but now in terms of nonadherence. 
 
TABLE 4.  STATE ADOPTION OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX PROVISIONS:  PERCENT 
OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX STATES 
Corporate Tax Provision Percent in 1967 Percent in 2005 
Loss Carryover 56.1 100 
Federal Tax Deductible 31.7 10.9 
Federal Income as Base 56.1 93.4 
Federal Depletion Allowance 58.5 93.1 
Federal Bonus Depreciation 78.0 28.3 
Corporate Tax Provision Percent in 1994 Percent in 2005 
Original Cost, Property Factor 84.8 86.0 
Officer’s Comp. in Payroll Factor 80.4 76.3 
401(k) Earnings in Payroll Factor 54.3 63.0 
Throwback Rule for Sales Factor 56.5 54.3 
UDITPA for Nonbus. Income  56.5 54.3 
Combined Reporting 65.2 50.0 
Note: For apportionment factors, applies only to those states that use the respective factor. 
Source: 2005 State Tax Handbook, CCH Inc.; State Tax Handbook, December 31, 1994, CCH 
Inc.; and State Tax Handbook, 1967, CCH Inc. 
 
 Movement toward uniformity is not so apparent in the lower panel of Table 4 
where the focus falls on state-specific tax provisions for a more recent time period.  
In only two cases have the states become more uniform: the use of original cost in 
defining the property factor and the inclusion of 401(k) earnings in the payroll factor.  
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Notably there has been slight movement away from UDITPA in defining allocable 
non-business income.   
 Table 5 is an MTC summary of adoption of model regulations, statutes and 
guidelines.  It clearly shows that member states are far more willing to pass 
uniformity recommendations at the Commission level than legislatively adopt them at 
the state level.  Most (full) compact members have adopted uniformity guidelines 
regarding income allocation and apportionment.  But for the vast majority of other 
initiatives—including apportionment of income for special industries—only a small 
number of member states have adopted the MTC policy.  In fact in one instance 
(collection of taxes on fundraising transactions, a relatively new guideline) there is no 
evidence that a single state has adopted the uniformity recommendation.  Not shown 
in the table is adoption of the uniform sales tax exemption form which now is used by 
38 states. 
Over time there is some tendency toward increased adoption of model 
guidelines.  MTC reports in its 1985/86 Annual Report that 20 states had formally or 
informally adopted its guidelines on apportionment and allocation, while the number 
was 25 states in 2002.  For airline apportionment there were 7 adopting states in 
1985/86 versus 11 in 2002; for railroads there were 7 states in 1985/86 and 12 in 
2002; for contractors there was no change over this time period (10 states in both 
years).   
 There is certainly greater uniformity in the structure of the corporate income 
tax today than there was when UDITPA was promulgated by NCCUSL and at the 
time of the Willis Commission.  MTC deserves at least some credit for this change in 
tax structure, but just how much will never be known.  While progress has been 
made, total uniformity will likely never be realized absent federal intervention given 
the self interest of the states.  Options for achieving greater uniformity are discussed 
next. 
Airlines
Construction 
Contractor Railroads Trucking
PL 86-272 
Guidelines
Television and 
Radio 
Broadcasting Publishing
Financial 
Institutions
Vendor 
Version
Vendee 
Version
Alabama * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase II<1> Yes Yes<1> Yes<1> Yes<1> No No No Yes No No No
Alaska * Yes<1> Yes<2> Yes<1> No Yes<1> Yes<1> No No Yes<1> No No No No No No No No
Arizona Yes No No No No No Yes No No No
Arkansas Yes<1> No No Yes<1> No Phase II No No Yes No
California * Yes No Yes Yes Yes<1> Phase II<1> Yes<1> Yes<1> Yes No No No No No No No No
Colorado Yes Yes<1> Yes Yes Yes Phase II Yes<1> No Yes No
Connecticut* No No No No No Phase II<1> No No No <3> Yes
Delaware No No No No No No No No No No
District of Columbia Yes<1> No No No No Phase I No No No No
Florida * <2> No No No No Phase I No No No No No No No Yes<1> No No No
Georgia* No No No No No No No No No N/D No No No No No No No
Hawaii * Yes No No No No Phase II Yes No Yes Yes<1> No No No No No No No
Idaho * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase II Yes Yes<1> Yes N/D No Yes No No No No No No
Illinois * Yes<1> No No No No Phase I No No No No No No No No No No No
Indiana <2> No No No No No No No No N/D
Iowa * No No No No No No No No No N/D No No No No No No No
Kansas * Yes Yes No No No Phase I<1> No No Yes N/D No No No No No No No
Kentucky* Yes<2> No No Yes No (informally) No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
Louisiana No No No No No Phase II No No No No
Maine* No No No No No Phase II<1> No No Substantial No
Maryland No No No No No No No No Substantial No
Massachusetts* No No No No No No No No Substantial No
Michigan (Single Business Tax) No No No No No No No No Yes No
Minnesota* No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Mississippi* No No No No No No No No Yes N/D No No No No No No No No
Missouri * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase I No No No No No No No No No No No
Montana * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase II Under rev. Under rev. No No No NR No No No No No No
Nebraska * Yes<1> Yes<1> No No Yes<1> No No No No No No No No No No No No
Nevada 
New Hampshire No No No No No No Yes No Yes <3>
New Jersey No No No No No No No No No No
New Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase II No No Yes No
New York No No No No No No No No No No
North Carolina* Yes<1> Sales Facto No Sales Factor Sales Factor No No No No No No NR No No No No No No
North Dakota * Yes Yes No Yes Yes Phase II Yes Yes Yes No Yes NR No No Yes No No Yes<1>
Ohio* No<1> No No No No Substantially No No Yes No Yes<1> No No No No No No Yes<1>
Oklahoma * <2> No No No No No No No No N/D No NR No No No No No No
Oregon * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Phase II<1> No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
Pennsylvania* <2> No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Rhode Island* No No No No No Phase II<1> No No Yes No No No No No No No No
South Carolina * No No No No No Yes<1> No No No N/D No No No Yes No No No
South Dakota* Yes Yes
Tennessee* No No No No No Phase I No No No <3> Yes<1> Yes<1>
Texas * No <3> No No Yes<1> Yes<1> Yes<1>
Utah * Yes No Yes Yes Yes Phase II<1> No No Yes N/D No No No Yes No No No
Vermont No No No No No No No No No No
Virginia No No No No No No No No No No
Washington (Business & OccupationNo No No No No No No No Yes N/D No No No No No No No
West Virginia* No No No No No No No No No N/D No No No No No No No
Wisconsin * <2> No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Wyoming * No No No No No No No
Total of Responding States: 35 25 11 10 12 12 25 8 4 22 2 3 1 0 1 8 1 1 2
* Responded to MTC Survey.
<1> With exceptions or additions.
<2> No formal adoption, but formula is similar to UDITPA; Multistate Tax Commission regulations adopted on modified basis.
<3> Does not recognize S Corporations.
N/D Not Determined.
NR No response.
Sources:  Research Institute of America; Commerce Clearing House; and 2000 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide, Aspen Publishers Inc.
Model 
Recordkeeping 
& Retention 
Statute
Applicability of 
Sales and/or 
Use Tax of 
Sales of 
Computer 
Software
No corporate income tax
Table 5:  Adoption of Multistate Tax Commission Model Regulations, Statutes and Guidelines
As of October 18, 2002
Uniform Principles 
Governing State 
Transactional 
Taxation of 
TelecommunicationsApportionment of Income for Special Industries
Allocation & 
Apportionment of 
Net Income
ABA Model S 
Corporation 
Income Tax Act 
with Six 
Proposed 
Modifications 
"MOSCITA"
Model Direct 
Pay Permit 
Regulation
Funeral 
Trust
No corporate income tax
State 
Uniform 
Protest 
Statute
No corporate income tax
No corporate income tax
Collection of 
Taxes on 
Fundraising 
Transactions
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8.  Options for Achieving Uniformity 
 The alternative approaches to achieving uniformity lie along a continuum.  At 
one extreme is complete state autonomy (including the absence of organizations such 
as the MTC that promote uniformity), while the other extreme is complete 
federalization of the state corporate tax (for example, an add-on to the federal 
corporate tax with the revenues distributed to states on a formula basis).  Between 
these extremes are a voluntary compact (i.e., the MTC model) and a federal mandate 
(e.g., the Willis Commission approach) which lies short of complete federal take over 
of the state corporate income taxes.  The trade-off along this continuum is between 
the degree of uniformity achieved (or more appropriately the reduction in the costs 
and inefficiency generated by non-uniformity) and the loss of state autonomy.  In this 
section, we consider these two approaches and discuss the nature of the trade-off.   
 It is most unlikely that all states will agree on a uniform corporate income tax 
structure.  This point was made in section 5 from a more theoretical perspective, 
while section 7 presented evidence of the change in the level of uniformity.  But this 
same conclusion has been reached by several authors.   
The Willis Commission Report (1965) concluded:  
Fifty years ago, as the first of the States adopted the income tax, 
forward-looking men warned of the dangers of each state taxing 
interstate commerce in its own way.  For 50 years State tax 
administrators have been discussing ways of achieving simplicity and 
uniformity.  One proposal after another has been formulated, 
discussed, revised, and in spite of the expenditure of enormous effort, 
discarded.  And, today, the States appear to be as far from a solution 
as they have ever been.  In short, history of 50 years of state income 
taxation leaves no room for optimism that the States will be any more 
successful in the future than they have in the past.   
 
The problems found in this system as it operates today are sufficiently 
troublesome to require that something must be done.  Even more 
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disquieting, however, are the prospects for the future.  There is every 
reason to believe that, without congressional action, the worst features 
of the present system will continue to multiply (p. 599). 
 
Henderson (1990), former chairman of the Tax Section of the New York State 
Bar Association, in an address to the National Association of State Sections, made the 
following statement, “One of our goals for the 1990s should be to encourage the 
states and cities—through federal action under the commerce clause of the 
Constitution if necessary—to adopt a single model income tax, so that only the rates 
will differ between jurisdictions” (pp. 1351-1352). 
While Shaviro (1993) notes that the level of “interstate cooperation is in some 
respects impressive” (p. 72), he goes on to state, “Yet the history of Supreme Court 
commerce clause litigation richly testifies to the incompleteness of interstate 
cooperation.  The important question is not whether existing cooperation is 
impressive and substantial but whether it is sufficient.  The practical evidence of non-
cooperation from litigated cases—which presumably would be even greater if states 
did not anticipate commerce clause challenges—accords with powerful theoretical 
reasons for expecting cooperation to fall well short of the optimum” (p. 78). 
The history of uniformity since the adoption of state corporate income taxes 
suggests that the states are not going to voluntarily achieve complete uniformity.  In 
the 50 some years since the Willis Commission and the 40 some years that the MTC 
has been in existence states have not reached agreement on uniformity (see section 7).   
 Nor is it clear that either states or interstate businesses will press for 
uniformity, a point made by Lindholm (1991).  Interstate businesses are interested in 
minimizing the sum of tax payments and compliance costs, not just compliance cost.  
To minimize taxes interstate businesses take advantage of interstate differences in 
state corporate tax structures.  Thus, businesses are not likely to lobby intensively for 
complete uniformity, a point made by Shaviro (1993).  This is in part reflected in the 
positions of business groups such as COST, which have been critics of the MTC. 
 Many states have not been supporters of the MTC and it regulations, as 
reflected by the number of states that are not MTC members, the number that have 
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not adopted UDIPTA in full and the incomplete adoption of other uniformity 
provisions.  Some of these states regard the MTC as an equal threat to their 
sovereignty (Sharpe 1975), and this is one reason that some states, for example, New 
York and Arizona, have either withdrawn from or not joined the MTC.  (New York is 
not a member, while Arizona adopted UDIPTA but is only an associate member.)  A 
second reason why states have not agreed on uniformity is that adoption of the 
proposed provision may lead to a reduction in a state’s tax revenue or to less 
economic development. 
If substantially greater uniformity is desired but not achievable by voluntary 
state action, then federal action is required.  The scope of a federal mandate could 
range from the extreme of converting the state corporate income tax into a federal add 
on with revenue allocated back to the state, to mandating uniformity of everything but 
the tax rate, to mandates over selected features of the tax, e.g., the apportionment 
formula.42  Certainly the Federal government has the power through the Commerce 
Clause to impose controls on state taxation, and has at times done so.  In particular, 
the Supreme Court has stated that the Commerce Clause provides sufficient 
justification for the federal government to require states to use uniform rules for 
apportioning or allocating income (see Moorman Manufacturing v. Bair, 1978).  And, 
the Federal government has taken action to limit the taxing authority of states, for 
example, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1975 (the so 
called 4 R Act which limits the ability of states to impose differential property taxes 
on railroads), the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, and of course Public Law 86-272. 
Is there federal interest at stake?  The dissent in the definitive case of U.S. 
Steel Corp. et al. v. Multistate Tax Commission (1978, p. 489) found ample federal 
interest given the “Willis Report, the Willis Bills, the successor bills, and the dozen 
shelvings of compact ratification bills.”   
                                                          
42Since the Willis Commission there have been several pieces of legislation introduced to increase 
uniformity of state corporate income taxes or at least to limit state discretion.  In the early years of 
the MTC, the various Annual Reports spend considerable time discussing various Congressional 
proposals regarding state taxation. 
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Might the Federal Government act?  While the Commerce Clause gives the 
federal government the authority to impose restrictions on interstate taxation, this is 
not a reason or cause for exercising such authority.  Rather, such action is likely to be 
the result of political pressure.  If states or interstate businesses lobbied the federal 
government for uniformity, then Congress may well act;  for example, public Law 
82-272 was enacted because of an outcry from businesses resulting from the 
Northwestern case.  As history suggests, Congress is not likely to act in response to 
the pleadings of academic tax policy experts.  But as we suggest, states oppose 
federal intervention since it would result in a loss of state sovereignty.  And, as long 
as the state corporate income tax system is not too outrageous, interstate businesses 
are not likely to demand complete uniformity, although they might push for further 
controls on state taxing authority.   This suggests that we should not look to the 
federal government to impose uniformity, particularly if this expands the state power 
to tax.  If that is true, we should seek ways of making the MTC more effective. 
Should the Federal Government act?  The principal argument against federal 
action is that the power to tax is seen as essential to the existence of state sovereignty 
(McLure and Hellerstein, 2004).  They argue that there are at least three reasons why 
it would be insufficient for states to have the power to spend, but with the federal 
government having the power to tax and distributes revenue to the states: 1) the 
federal government is likely to impose constraints on how states spend the revenue; 
2) the ability of the state to shape its public sector would be substantially limited; and 
3) state spending of federal funding is likely to be “bloated and wasteful.”  
Hellerstein has stated, “Absent some pressing need for federal intervention…the 
states should be free to go their own way” (cited in footnote 5 of Shaviro, 1993).   
There are many arguments advanced in support of autonomy for state and 
local governments.  Some of the arguments are based on the economic efficiency 
inherent in providing the appropriate level and mix of public services at the right 
scale and which match inter-jurisdictional differences in tastes.  The basis for this 
argument are that smaller governments are more responsive to the preferences of 
voters and that more jurisdictional choice leads to inter-government competition that 
drives government to be efficient and to keep taxes low.  Support for a more 
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decentralized governmental structure is also found in the Madisonian view that by 
dividing political authority the potential to do great harm is reduced. 
 These arguments are relevant to federal control over both tax base and rate, 
but they do not seem to be as relevant to a federally mandated uniform corporate tax 
base.  Furthermore, given that corporate income tax revenue is a small and declining 
share of state tax revenue, a federal mandate that did not restrict the tax rate that 
could be imposed would seem to have little consequence on the ability of the state to 
provide the appropriate level and mix of public services.  But if uniformity meant an 
expanded capacity to tax multistate businesses, the federal government may be loath 
to act. 
 There are other arguments in favor of state autonomy on tax matters.  First, 
autonomy on tax matters would allow state governments to exploit and develop the 
resources they already posses.  Second, autonomy promotes experimentation with 
different kinds of tax rules or tax policy.  Shaviro (1993) argues that while these 
points have some validity they have “limited consequences” (p. 78).   
The first point implies that state governments should be allowed to exploit its 
unique or monopoly-like positions to the benefit of its citizens, for example, by 
imposing heavy taxes on natural resources or on tourists/conventioneers.  For the 
corporate income tax, this would allow the state to design its apportionment formula 
to take advantage of the nature of the state’s economic structure, in essence allowing 
the state to use it competitive advantage to “export” part of its corporate tax.  But the 
state’s ability to tailor its corporate income tax also allows the state to react to 
differential elasticities of capital mobility.  While tax credits are one way of reducing 
taxes to mobile capital, states might shift their apportionment formula to a single 
sales factor formula or adopt special tax provisions in order to reduce the tax burden 
on more mobile capital. 
The second argument, i.e., state experimentation, is a traditional one.  But 
Shaviro suggests that when one considers the wide range of diversity in tax matters, 
and that many of the experiments are adopted as ways of exporting taxes “it is hard to 
remain confident that the ‘laboratory’ is yielding an acceptable ratio of benefits to 
costs.” (p. 94) 
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After considering these arguments for federalism, Shaviro (1993) concludes, 
“while state and local governments serve a number of important purposes, the case 
for preserving their discretion in deciding what to tax (as opposed to how much to 
tax) seems weak. …This seems particularly true for relatively narrow and esoteric tax 
issues, such as the design details for a particular tax base” (p. 94). 
In terms of specific Federal action, mandating a system that included 
specifying the tax rate would seem to be extreme.  However, Rivlin (1991) proposed 
a common shared tax with the proceeds allocated to states on a formula basis.  While 
such a scheme could be adopted by interstate compact, she thought it was more 
realistic that the federal government would have to enact the tax and collect the tax 
on behalf of the states.43   
While such a mandate is not the same as general revenue sharing, it has many 
of the same features.  But the U.S. experiment with general revenue sharing did not 
last very long.  This leads to the obvious concern that if the federal government were 
to assume responsibility for collecting state corporate income tax and distributing the 
revenues back to the states via a formula, the federal government would at some point 
decide to usurp all or part of the revenue. 
An argument for not having the federal government dictate the tax base is that 
such a step may start us on a slippery slope.  The federal government has already 
taken steps to restrict state taxation, in what might be considered relatively minor 
ways.  Specifying everything about the state corporate income tax other than the tax 
rate would be a much bigger step.  Sharpe (1975), for example, points out that, “The 
danger of the Willis Bill stemmed, not from the extent to which it restricted the 
states’ sovereignty in this particular instance, but from its critical precedential value 
in extending federal control over state systems of taxation” (p. 243).  Concern over 
recent federal government’s actions regarding state sovereignty has lead the National 
                                                          
43The proposed tax was part of a larger proposal for a reconsideration of the current state of 
federalism, and in particular for the states to take a larger role in providing services such as health 
care.  The call for a common tax was driven by the concerns that states compete with each other 
and that states have unequal resources.   
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Conference of State Legislatures to launch Preemption Monitor to track pending 
federal legislation and Supreme Court cases.   
A similar point was made in an MTC report on federalism, “Over time, 
however, states’ ability to raise their own revenue through their tax systems has come 
under intense pressure from the federal government, especially where state and local 
taxation affects interstate commerce.”  (Multistate Tax Commission 2003c, p. 29)  
Thus, the issue is not just federal mandates for the structure of the corporate income 
tax, but the fear of broader federal intervention in state and local tax issues. 
A more practical issue with a federally-mandated state corporate income tax 
base is whether such a mandate could be enforced.  Would such a mandate 
encompass a levy like the Michigan single business tax?  Would states simply adopt 
yet another tax on corporations or adopt programs that target financial benefits to 
selected corporations in place of tax benefits?  The answer is likely to be yes.  
 One can also point to the experience of local governments and the control 
imposed by state governments on taxing authority.  While the Dillon Rule is not the 
same as the Commerce Clause, it provides similar authority, and states have certainly 
used the power to restrict local taxes, e.g., by imposing property tax limitations and 
expanding tax exemptions.  State governments frequently treat local governments as 
just one more special interest group rather than a partner.  If the federal government 
were to treat states the way some states treat local governments, states do have 
justification for being concerned. 
 In 2001, the MTC sponsored a series of public seminars on state taxation and 
federalism.  As might be expected, the report of those seminars (Multistate Tax 
Commission, 2003c) supported state control over state taxes.  “The authority to tax is 
a key element of state sovereignty and is critical to the ability of states to serve the 
needs of their citizens and interstate commerce effectively” (p. 6).  However, while 
the MTC argues for state sovereignty in the aggregate in tax matters, it calls for states 
to give up their individual sovereignty by agreeing to common tax provisions.  The 
report goes on to suggest that, “The tensions surrounding state taxation of interstate 
commerce can be resolved through greater uniformity and coordination among states 
in their tax policies and administrative practices affecting interstate commerce.  To 
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preserve state sovereign authority and create a productive partnership with Congress 
on issues of taxation, the Commission recommends….” (p. 6).  The report’s 
recommendations include action to strengthen interstate coalitions, enhance 
cooperation between the states and the federal government, work cooperatively with 
Congress to enact legislation that supports equitable state taxation, and “coordinate 
federal and state tax bases in a manner that facilitates federal fiscal policy while 
minimizing adverse effects on states and localities” (pp. 6-7). 
Sharpe (1975) argued that, “UDITPA and the Willis Commission represent 
polar extremes, volunteerism and coercion.  Neither offered the delicate uniformity 
needed to restore a balance among sovereignty, fairness, and federalism” (p. 243).  
What is that balance?  The level of uniformity achieved through a voluntary compact 
will be imperfect.  Federal mandate will achieve uniformity and lower efficiency 
costs, but at the cost of a lost of state control, i.e., a federalism issue.  In both 
situations, states lose individual sovereignty.  Clearly, there is a difference between 
voluntarily giving up sovereignty and having the federal government mandate it, even 
if the resulting corporate tax structure is the same in both cases.  So, the basic issue is 
whether the cost imposed by the current level of non-uniformity is sufficiently high to 
warrant the lost of control to the federal government.  Federal imposition of identical 
tax rates would be extreme, i.e., would not justify the reduction in state sovereignty.  
But, since empirical evidence is so limited, it is not clear if the benefit from increased 
uniformity exceeds the increased cost from reduced state sovereignty.   
There are options for seeking state corporate income tax uniformity that lie 
between a voluntary compact and a federal mandate. For example, suppose that states 
were to agree on a uniform tax structure (e.g., tax legislation like UDIPTA), but with 
rates set by the states, where agreement would require approval of, say, half of the 
states (with a corporate income tax) comprising at least 60 percent of the U.S. 
population.  The federal government could then mandate that each state follow this 
structure, or provide incentives to the states to adopt the structure, for example, tie 
some grant programs to the states’ adoption of the structure.  The MTC could be 
given the responsibility to issue regulations and to propose changes to the law, with 
approval of some supermajority of the states.  The federal government would yield its 
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authority to the MTC in the sense that the federal government would not change the 
law without MTC agreement, although it is not clear how this could be accomplished.  
In practice, such a plan is not likely to surface, especially in light of the states’ 
opposition to a binding compact. 
In summary, voluntary cooperation will not yield complete uniformity, or 
even substantial uniformity on state corporate income tax policy issues.  But it is not 
clear that states and interstate businesses, and perhaps even the MTC, really desire 
near uniformity.  If uniformity is to be substantially increased, federal intervention 
will be required, which involves a trade off between the benefits of increased 
uniformity and the cost of the reduction in state sovereignty. 
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9.  Concluding Remarks 
If the basic question is “Can the Multistate Tax Compact succeed?”44 a 
simple answer is ‘yes’ given that it became effect in August 1967 and remains a 
viable organization almost 38 years later in helping states administer their particular 
corporate income taxes. In essence, that is all the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in 
1978 (in U.S. Steel Corp. et al. v. Multistate Tax Commission) as to the validity of the 
Multistate Tax Compact – that the Compact merely helps states do what they could 
do otherwise and neither diminishes federal power nor increases the states’ power.   
The next question is to succeed at what?  While the MTC has engaged in 
many worthwhile activities, the goal that is examined in this paper, as stated in the 
Compact’s Purpose (Article I), is to “promote uniformity.”  The MTC falls short of 
achieving uniformity, but, then again, one can “promote” without having to show any 
results. Clearly, a goal of “no state left behind” has not been achieved.  Then again, it 
is quite presumptuous to have assumed, or to continue to assume, that the MTC is all 
that it takes to achieve tax uniformity given the pronounced (and desirable) 
competitive nature of states in a federal system.  In 1978, even the Court was less 
than confident that the goal would be achieved when it said “to the extent that the 
Commission succeeds in promoting uniformity…” (p. 474).  To the credit of the 
member states united by the Compact, the MTC has faithfully pushed the need for 
uniformity and cooperation against the competitive nature of states and the forceful 
challenge of corporate taxpayers.  Of course, this has been achieved by redefining 
success – as in finding a way to get as many states as possible at the discussion table 
even if it takes expanding the terms of participation to include different member 
classifications. Fundamentally, the conflicting goals of sovereignty and uniformity 
clash.  However, while the MTC argues for state sovereignty in the aggregate in tax 
matters, it calls for states to give up their individual sovereignty by agreeing to 
common tax provisions.  
Game theory suggests that it should not be a surprise that cooperation and 
uniformity are hard to achieve.  Cooperation is possible, but not always.  Moreover, 
                                                          
44 Based on the title of Dimock and Benson (1937) book: “Can Interstate Compacts Succeed?” 
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the experience of interstate compacts and their administrative entities – the compact 
commission – confirms that trying to define the success of these organizations is 
illusive. 
There are alternatives to the current situation of non-uniformity of corporate 
taxation.  The federal government could assert its rights under interstate commerce to 
clean up what McLure (1986, p. 131) termed “a mess,” either by state invitation or 
federal fiat.  Voluntarily giving up state sovereignty is unlikely to provoke a positive 
response from states absent a tangible carrot – the assurance of money (either 
preventing the loss of the existing level of collections or, better yet, capturing an 
increase).  The cost of non-conformity for elected officials and corporate taxpayers, 
in particular, and the economy, in general, remains unanswered. 
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